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When analyzing the role of judicial power the issue becomes whether
it is legitimate for the Supreme Court to interpret the constitutional text
in undeniable contradiction to the clearly expressed intent of its Fram-
ers.' Proponents of the current activist position of the Court answer in
the affirmative, using nine complex and interrelated arguments.2 They
may be briefly sketched here:
1. The Past is Dead - The Constitution Living
To endure societal change our Constitution must remain adaptable,
"always being updated to meet the exigencies of succeeding generations."8
t Copyright 1984 William Gangi.
I would like to thank my colleague, Henry Paolucci (St. John's University, New York)
and Professors Thomas Schrock (University of California-Santa Barbara) and Christopher
Wolfe (Marquette University) for their demanding intellects and critical eyes. I also would
like to express my appreciation to the Earhart Foundation for supporting my research.
* Ph.d., Notre Dame, 1971. Associate Professor, Department of Government and Politics,
St. John's University, New York.
See Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
527, 530 (1979).
' This article will not reiterate the arguments discussed extensively elsewhere. See Gangi,
Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 1, 17-55
(1981). The purpose of this section will be to acquaint the reader with the main arguments
of the debate, solely from the perspective of those supporting increased judicial power.
3 Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With
Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 584
(1973).
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2. When a vacuum exists in pursuing "societal ideals"'
After World War II the more sensitive among us became aware of a
variance between our professed belief in liberty and equality and the ex-
isting realities of racial discrimination and the status of the criminally
accused. Someone had to take action, and only the Court seemed capable
and willing to give this country's ideals a legal, constitutionally rooted
foundation.6
3. the Supreme Court is best suited
Our democratic process breaks down when either freedom of expres-
sion is hampered or minorities are permanently excluded from electoral
participation. 6 Under these circumstances the judiciary enjoys greater
flexibility than the executive or legislative branches of government, be-
cause it is not susceptible to constituent pressures.7 This fact has led Pro-
fessor Louis Lusky to observe that in recent years the Court has claimed
a "new and grander conception of its own place in the governmental
scheme."
4. to obtain results.
Neither the Constitution nor the Court should be fettered by the
views of men long dead. The spirit, not the letter, of the law must endure
by assuring that our ideals remain meaningful. While judicial interpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, for example, may not be consistent
" There are numerous expressions articulating the "ideal" portion of this argument. For
example, Professor Perry utilizes the phrases "professed ideals," Perry, Book Review, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 685, 699 (1978), and "societal ideals," id. at 700; see L. LUSKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? 97-115, 211-42 (1975). Use of these phrases tends to mask the fact that what is being
discussed are "rights" lacking historical association with those articulated by the Framers.
See Gangi, supra note 2, at 39-43 (unwarranted expansion of fourteenth amendment
liberties).
' An expression of this viewpoint may be found in G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRA-
DMON 369 (1976). The author states:
Because appellate judging has often been defined by judges and commentators in
terms of constraints, one may incline to underemphasize its freedoms, which are wor-
thy of recapitulation. First ... is the power to declare ... what "the law" is. Ameri-
can judges function as the primary interpreters of the meaning of the Constitution or
a statute, until the sovereign people, through their legislative representatives, choose
to change that meaning .... Judges in America can declare and thereby make law.
Id. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 245-56.
* L. LUsKY, supra note 4, at 109-10; see also S. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 20-22 (1978) (activists' approach when deciding personal liberty questions).
7 See A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 49-50 (1971).
8 Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy? 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403,
408 (1979).
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with the original intentions of its framers, it has resulted in the expansion
of suffrage, reforms in race relations, and more humane state and federal
criminal justice systems.9
5. In the context of a cumbersome amendment process,
Like the legislative process, the amendment process "is often blocked
by inertia or irresponsibility." 10 In addition, malapportionment contrib-
utes to paralysis of legislative institutions already circumscribed by con-
stituent prejudice."' Adjudication provides a far more efficient path for
social reform than the "more cumbersome instrument of an
amendment."
12
6. the Court has the responsibility for securing individual rights.
The essence of our constitutional tradition consists of the protection
and expansion of equality and individual rights.1 3 Most recently, the
Court has concentrated on "preferred freedoms."" "Our judicial branch,
with the Supreme Court at its apex, is the greatest institutional and con-
stitutional safeguard we possess; only those committed to libertarian sui-
cide would sanction a transfer of the judicial guardianship of our basic
civil rights and liberties to either the legislature or the executive or
9 Gangi, supra note 2, at 33-35; see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966) (equal protection clause prohibits state from requiring the payment of a poll tax by
citizens in order to vote in state elections); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)
(fourteenth amendment incorporates sixth amendment right to counsel in state criminal
proceeding); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (equal protection clause
prohibits intentional segregation in state school system).
10 Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6 HAsmls
CONST. L.Q. 511, 525 (1979).
" See id.
1I Id.
' See, e.g., J. BURNS, J. PELTASON & T. CRONIN, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 4-5 (10th ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE]. But see Kurland, Ruminations on
the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979). It is generally stated that our
tradition of liberty and equality began with the Declaration of Independence, see GOVERN-
MENT BY THE PEOPLE, supra, at 4-5, and that the Framers were Lockeans who perceived the
relationship between citizens and government as a social contract intended to secure natural
rights, see, e.g., R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 17-18 (1981). Other com-
mentators dismiss tradition as a viable starting point of analysis. See, e.g., Ely, The Su-
preme Court, 1977 Term-Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv.
5, 39-43 (1978); Peiry, Non-Interpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Jus-
tification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 283-88 (1981); cf. infra notes 89-90, 201-37 and accompa-
nying text.
"' For a discussion of the "preferred freedoms," see L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITuTIONAL
LAW § 11-1, at 565 (1978). For a discussion of the rights that today are found in the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights see infra note 87.
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both!"15
7. This new Court role has been accepted by the American people
Even if it is conceded that the Court has gone beyond the original
limits of judicial power, the American people have consented to this ex-
tension; their tacit approval can be implied from their acceptance of the
results achieved. If the people did not accept this new judicial role, they
would have taken appropriate measures to curb the Court's power.1 6
8. and is irreversible.
Supporters of judicial power contend that "under our constitutional
scheme . . . rights do and should expand."'17 The Court, therefore, prop-
erly employs a double standard when considering property and personal
rights. With respect to the former, the Court is more inclined to defer to
legislative judgment, accept stare decisis and permit legislative social
experimentation. 18
9. The time has come to recognize explicitly our LegisCourt.
Today the pretense that the Court is engaging merely in judicial re-
view or rooting its decisions in the constitutional text should be dropped.
"[I]f they are, in fact, legislating under the guise of judging, shouldn't
they state this frankly and clearly in their decisions? . . . Are the Ameri-
can people entitled to truth in judging?""'
As a result of the above politico-constitutional view, the Supreme
Court currently acts simultaneously as the umpire of our constitutional
system and as its most important policymaker.20 Some commentators, in-
cluding myself, have challenged these arguments, regarding them as both
repetitious of the laissez-faire Court and inconsistent with the design of
the Founding Fathers.2 1 The Court thus is charged with usurping the or-
" Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice at any Cost"? The Judicial Role Re-
visited: Reflections on Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 481 (1979).
"8 Cf. Knowlton, Book Review, 32 ARK. L. REV. 157, 163 (1978) (failure of executive and
legislative branches to respond to the growth of power in the judiciary indicates
acquiescence).
17 A. GOLDBERG,, supra note 7, at 85.
18 See id. at 41-42.
19 Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A. J. 1212, 1214 (1977).
20 Id. at 1216; see, e.g., Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
15 (1978); see G. WHITE, supra note 5, at 370-71.
"I As Professor Berger expressed it: "[W]hat is sound sense for the impeachment of Richard
Nixon does not become nonsense when applied for refutation of Chief Justice Warren."
Berger, supra note 1, at 623.
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dinary legislative power and circumventing the specified amendment pro-
cedures. This Article offers some historical and theoretical criteria and
seeks to explain more fully why the clearly discernible intentions of the
Framers are the most appropriate perspective for constitutional scholars.
I. THE STATE OF THE ART
Progress
The idea of a paradise on earth-a millenium-is as old, if not older,
than the Torah and the New Testament."' Millennialism had been wide-
spread for several centuries following the death of Christ.23 In the 16th
century, it reemerged when Protestant theologians, seeking solace and
understanding, resurrected and reinterpreted the noted apocalyptic liter-
ature.24 Wishing to raise the hopes of beleaguered Protestants by chal-
, See N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE MILLENNIUM xiii (1961).
I continue here a discussion initiated elsewhere on the role that progress has played in
constitutional law. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 65-67. The type of research necessary for
such a discussion is just beginning to emerge. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 99-111 (1977). The problem, of course, is that we are too close, still enraptured by the
power that knowledge of "progress" creates. See infra text accompanying note 169. So much
so that an intellect like Alexander Bickel could approach it, but fall short, in a chapter
entitled "Remembering the Future." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRESS 102 (1970). For assessments of Bickel's position, see Ely, supra note 13, at 54-55, and
Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 H.av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
521, 549 (1976).
23 See N. COHN, supra note 22, at 1-13. By the reign of Constantine in the 4th century,
Christianity had been established and millennialism would play no official part in Catholic
thought for the next 1000 years. Id. at 14. St. Augustine formulated the Catholic doctrine
regarding apocalyptic literature such as Revelation. See infra text accompanying note 26.
Augustine claimed that Revelation was to be understood as a spiritual allegory and that the
Millennium commenced with the birth of Christ and was realized completely in the Church.
N. COHN, supra note 22, at 14. Moreover, St. Augustine posited that sacred scriptural im-
agery could not be used to foretell the future by ascribing concrete occurrences to the im-
agery in Revelation, and then following the sequence of events in order to predict when
other events would occur. See E. TUvESON, MILLENNIUM AND UTOPIA 15-18 (1964). Joachim
of Flora, a 13th century Catholic monk, wrote the first work contrary to the viewpoint for-
mulated by St. Augustine. Id. at 19. In it, he divided history into three ascending ages-the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Id. He had an "unmistakeable progressivist tone," foreshad-
owing by six centuries Comte's division of history into three "upward" stages. Id. at 20.
Joachim used the scriptural apocalyptic literature to foretell the future, offering the specific
date of the commencement and describing the third age in detail as paradise of "love, joy
and freedom" where the Word is written directly in the hearts of men and where "no wealth
or even property" would exist. N. COHN, supra note 22, at 100. Finally, according to Joa-
chim, precursing Marx 600 years hence, the Church and State would wither away. See id. at
101; E. TUVESON, supra, at 20; E. VOEGELIN, SCIENCE, POLITICS AND GNOSTICISM 98-99 (1968).
24 E. TUVESON, supra note 23, at 56-66. As Professor Cohn demonstrates throughout his
work, the rich allegorical imagery present in VII, Book of Daniel, and John's Revelation
were reinterpreted each century to fit the circumstances. This literature "catered at all
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lenging the then prevalent view of a declining and dying earth, 8 these
theologians accordingly produced evidence of earlier upward and down-
ward civilization cycles, and contended what even Saint Augustine could
not deny, that the Book of Revelation implied a future millenium.2 Pro-
gress and not decay, therefore, could lie in the future."
In the 17th century the new philosophy based on the natural sciences
contributed to the optimism generated theologically, providing empirical
proof of progress." By the 18th century, however, the theological roots
were forgotten and the doctrine of secular progress completely replaced
its earlier theological equivalent: Providence. In the same manner, theo-
logical doctrines on the character of paradise after death were trans-
formed into secular belief in a utopia on earth.29 Knowledge of the "laws
of nature" 0 eventually permitted the emergence of the New Jerusalem.3 1
times for the perennial craving of anxious mortals for an unquestionable forecast of the
future." N. COHN, supra note 22, at 18.
E. TUVESON, supra note 23, at 13-14.
See id. at 69-70.
See id.
Id. at vi.
The coming together of the New Philosophy and the revival of the belief in a literal
millennial end to history produced the Idea of Progress. . . .[W]ithout the combina-
tion of these two great idealogies, the faith in the secular millennialism that we know
as Progress could never have arisen. For that combination created the great charac-
teristic modern belief that advance in technology, standard of living, and other purely
material aspects of culture is advance religiously and spiritually as well-that man
gets better and better as he controls nature more and more; and, on the other hand,
there has been the materialization of religion, to which, as I try to show, a revival of
literal millennialism would easily lead.
Id.
See id. at 153-203.
The roots of modern natural law theory may be found in the natural sciences. As man
discovered the physical laws of the universe, so too would he discover similar "natural laws"
that govern man in society and destiny. See G. NIEMEYER, BETWEEN NOTHINGNESS AND PAR-
ADISE 45 (1971). Serious deficiencies can be found in the legal literature with respect to
discussions of classical and modern natural law theories. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 13, at 22-
32; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Con-
stitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1042-45 (1980). Several of these misconceptions
should be noted.
(1) In much contemporary legal literature a continuity is assumed between classical
right by nature theory and modern natural rights. Cf. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND His-
TORY 221 (1952).
(2) Classical right by nature and modern natural law theories contain radically different
perceptions of "man's nature," yet we refer to both positions as "natural law" theories as if
they are compatible. The classic perception of the "mature man," one who has his intellec-
tual and spiritual priorities in proper proportion and order, also differs from our "normal"
man today. See L. STRAUSS, supra, at 127-29; E. VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS
64-66 (1952) [hereinafter cited as NEW SCIENCE].
(3) Voegelin contends that classical right by nature theory was eventually "dogma-
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Preoccupation with the true path of progress became the basis of Social
tized"; insights into man's nature, as well as man's relationship with transcendence became
rigid doctrinal "'metaphysics'" - something never intended by Plato and Aristotle. See E.
VOEGELIN, ANAMNESIS 186-87 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ANAMNESIS].
(4) There has been little effort to understand classical right by nature theory, as it was
understood by its proponent.
Classical right theory was very practical, sketching a paradigm - what the best state or
regime might look like if the best circumstances were present. The natural right position did
not believe that the best regime could automatically come into existence because all the
ideal circumstances were present but only that it was not contrary to reason. If, however,
the best regime did come into existence, the philosopher-king should rule because he would
bring wisdom and power together. See L. STRAusS, supra, at 135-47. In less than ideal cir-
cumstances right by nature theory required a corresponding dilution in how the regime was
to be ruled, yet it sought to come as close to the best regime as the actual circumstances
would permit. The "art" of evaluating how much of what was possible could be injected into
existing circumstances without going too far, or not far enough, was called political science.
See id. at 142-43; E. VOEGELIN, 3 ORDER AND HISTORY: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 294-98 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as PLATO].
It is suggested that since Ely's discussion fails to make the above distinctions, and is
dependent essentially on contemporary philosophy and "natural law" theory, his discussion
of natural law and reason and their rejection is inadequate.
11 E. TuVESON, supra note 23, at 7-8. There are several general themes that are relevant
here. First, if laws of nature regarding man and society presumably existed from the begin-
ning of time, why had they not been previously discovered? Since the 16th century the
constant answer to that question has been (though the "laws" found varied considerably)
that until then (meaning, when each law is discovered), the "natural laws" were "hidden"
from man by existing institutions-church, state, and family. Institutions had a vested in-
terest in seeking to hide these natural laws from men. See G. NtmMExYE, supra note 30, at
11.
Second, it is necessary to destroy existing institutions and practices in order to permit
the natural laws to do their magic. Once freed, no longer inhibited by institutions or prac-
tices, these natural laws would have progressively beneficent effects on society. Particulars,
of course, varied with the thinker, as did the degree of destructiveness required-a topic
related to development of the idea of progress. There are three primary categories: (a) where
the focus falls on the end to be achieved (teleological); (b) where the emphasis falls on a
"'value' in the form of abstract ideal proposition," id. at 42, and (c) where the emphasis
falls on the activities necessary to achieve either-(a) or (b) (activist). Hence, when the
practitioners are of utopian (b) or progressivist (a) persuasion, programs regarding the end
of value would leave "a good deal of the ultimate perfection to gradual evolution and com-
promising on a tension between achievement and ideal, while the activist variety will tend to
[take] violent action toward the complete realization of the perfect realm." See id. at 41-43,
73-79; NEW SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 88-92.
Third, these "hidden" laws of nature have been viewed as if they were an object in
history. As God knew Providence, so some thinkers claim they could know the end of his-
tory. Joachim of Flora first developed the symbol of stages of unfolding historical drama.
His basis was scriptural, while subsequent ones were "scientific." Though varied in content,
the symbol of historical stages has been constant, promulgated by such thinkers as Turgot,
Condorcet, Fourier, Comte, Spencer, and Marx. These beliefs also influenced 20th century
legal thinkers such as Pound. See G. Ni.ME TR, supra note 30, at 3-72; supra note 22.
Fourth, and finally, many post-eighteenth century thinkers assume that man has no
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Darwinism, laissez-faire economics, and the "new scientific philosophy of
the universal law." ' Indeed, concern for progress has influenced modern
jurisprudence for one hundred years.8 3 The pervasiveness of its unproven
assumptions remains the bane of contemporary scholarship."
The Seduction of the Supreme Court
Science in the mid-19th century opened new vistas for understanding
the universe." In England, Herbert Spencer, Darwin's most important
advocate, transformed "Darwin's biological laws into social 'laws.'
[Slociety, too, [like an animal species], was an organism that evolved by
the survival of the fittest.""6 Spencer also accepted the theory that "the
intellectual powers of the race would become cumulatively greater, and
over several generations the ideal man would finally be developed. 3 7 By
1864 Social Darwinism had become a social force in the United States."8
"nature," and is infinitely perfectible. As today, the road to the New Jerusalem, of course, is
varied. One common early 20th century belief was that changes in the environment would
cause genetic changes, and those improvements would then be transmitted from generation
to generation. Such views were assumed by Marx and Engels. See Yoder, Science vs. Ideol-
ogy: The Case of Lysenko, 8 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 45, 45-46 (1972).
3' See E. TIvEsON, supra note 23, at 148.
' For a discussion of the Court's "super-legislative" determinations in the economic and
preferred freedom areas, see infra note 75.
4 See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 102-81; Ely, supra note 13, at 52-54; Perry, supra
note 13, at 310-14.
" Although both natural sciences and theological speculation gave birth to progress, the
theological roots were lost by the 19th century. Principles and methodology initially devel-
oped in the hard sciences were, in the name of progress, applied to what would be described
as the social sciences.
Progressivist thinking almost inevitably leads to viewing history from a futuristic per-
spective: the law reflects knowledge of where history is moving. The past becomes largely
irrelevant except inasmuch as it "fits" on a continuum between what existed, and what
proponents often "know" the future will be.
E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 90-91 (1966). Spencer and Comte were the origi-
nators of modern sociology. Spencer's "science" of sociology led him to propose that the
only way to improve the human condition was to do nothing to meet the effects of economic
competition. See R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 38-51 (rev. cloth
ed. 1959). Furthermore, Spencer believed that progress was a necessity and that human
perfection was inevitable. Comte, however, contended that in his "science" of sociology a
planned and controlled society was required. Id. at 83. For one commentator's comparison
of modern sociological theory, see J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 62-63 (1975).
3" R. HOFsTADTER, supra note 36, at 39 (emphasis added). "The ultimate development of
the ideal man is logically certain .... Progress . . . is not an accident, but a necessity.
Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature; . . . [like] the development of
the embryo or the unfolding of a flower." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted) (quoting H. SPENCER,
SOCIAL STATICS 79-80 (1850)). Once progress is assumed, a "new man" is always just dawn-
ing--or is on the horizon. See infra note 148.
" R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 36, at 44-46.
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During this "Age of Faith" it. became fashionable to believe that legal
truth was a species of scientific truth: that "law [was] a science. "s The
belief that "there [was] such a thing as the one true rule of law which,
being discovered, [would] endure, without change, forever" was
prevalent."0
Since law now possessed a scientific method, analogous to that in the
natural sciences, "the law library [became the] laboratory" and the
"printed case reports" became the "experimental materials."' 1 Case re-
porting emerged as a "new type of legal literature."' 2 Casebooks replaced
treatises. Advocates proposed a methodical approach that suggested
"'the vast majority [of past cases were] worse than useless, for any pur-
pose of systematic study.' """ The "principal function of the new aca-
demic [case reporting] literature was to draw the line between the correct
cases and the vast majority of worthless ones.""
The incorporation of these natural laws of laissez-faire thinking into
constitutional law eventually impacted on legislative attempts to address
various societal needs.4 5 The laissez-faire ideology that had dominated the
"Age of Faith" was soon challenged by a growing progressivist move-
ment."" During the succeeding "Age of Anxiety," reform in the form of
recodification emphasized legal realism, suggesting that judges created
rather than found law,'47 and, thus, all precedents now were to be ex-
39 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 42-43.
40 Id. at 43; see also Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Le-
gal History, 17 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 280 (1973) (the American ideology since the 19th
century has been "that law is a science discoverable by reason and that its scientific charac-
ter is what distinguishes law from politics .... It distinguishes reason and learning from
will and power").
41 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 47. Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first dean of
Harvard Law School, epitomized the "law as a science" age, id. at 42, and was the originator
of the case method of teaching, id. at 125 n.3.
"1 Id. at 58. Professor Gilmore particularly noted the role of the West Publishing Company,
which "made a contribution to our legal history [that] may have dwarfed the contributions
of ... all the learned professors on all the great law faculties." Id. at 59.
48 Id.
14 Id. In other words, case reporters need not publish every case adjudicated. Id. Professor
Gilmore adds, however, that "string citations of the wrongly decided cases, . . . not infre-
quently outnumbered the parallel strings of correct cases." Id. In short, it-was not experi-
ence that determined truth but "knowledge" of what was consistent with the natural eco-
nomic laws of society.
48 See A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 15-16; G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 64-67; Horwitz,
supra note 40, at 278.
46 One should remain cognizant of how nineteenth century science introduced race superior-
ity into public considerations of justice. See generally R. HOFSTAD'FER, supra note 36, at
170-200 (sociological approach to racism and public policy).
47 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 70-71.
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amined.' s No longer would only the correct principle be sought; instead,
the operative facts of each case would be analyzed. 9
Legal realism and progressivist politics converged during the period
of the New Deal.50 Having experienced the deadening, ideological hand of
laissez-faire adjudication, the Progressivist-Realist coalition was in no
mood to brook judicial interference:
judicial power was [to be] a relic of the dead past. The Realists ...
stripped the judges of their trappings of black-robed infallibility and re-
vealed them to be human beings whose decisions were motivated much
more by irrational prejudice than by rules of law. The law, state and federal,
was in process of being reduced to statutory form with most of the signifi-
cant continuing problems being committed to administrative agencies. The
judicial role was bound to become progressively more modest, more
mechanical, more trivial. 1
The clash over New Deal legislation between the Progressivist-Realists
and a Supreme Court still dominated by laissez-faire thinking, ended in
victory for the former.6 2 Thereafter, the Court, criticized and politically
threatened, retreated and eventually explicitly disavowed any right to
18 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 79. The followers of Langdell advocated studying a few
correct cases and disregarding the rest. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Arthur
Corbin, one of the great post-Langdellian scholars, advocated studying all the cases. G. GEL-
MORE, supra note 22, at 79.
" G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 79.
Id. at 90. Gilmore notes that reform took the form of recodification: "to free judges...
from the fetters of aberrant precedents in unenlightened jurisdictions." Id. at 71; see infra
text accompanying notes 263-64.
51 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 92. Respecting sociological jurisprudence, Professor Hor-
witz notes: "The principle argument is that there is some sort of inevitable and necessary
unfolding of different stages of legal ideas." Horwitz, supra note 40, at 279. The "stages"
proposed by Roscoe Pound were (a) Archaic Law; (b) Strict Law; (c) Liberalization. Id.
However, "never are we told why the second stage becomes the third or, indeed, which social
forces gain and which lose by this transition." Id.
"" Holland, American Liberals and Judicial Activism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal from the
New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J. 1025, 1026 n.3 (1976). Holland further explains that Felix
Frankfurter was one of the formulators of "Robert La Follette's platform plank in 1924
which called for a constitutional amendment giving Congress power to override Supreme
Court invalidation of federal statutes by a two-thirds vote. Frankfurter even advanced the
modest proposal of excising the due process clause from the fourteenth amendment." Id. at
1036 n.28.
Professor Gilmore notes that the change from laissez-faire thinking to a New Deal phi-
losophy was "not much more than a changing of the guard," G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at
87, "a change of course, not a change of goal," id. at 100. This much is clear: "[Tihe slogan
'law is a science' became 'law is a social science.' Where Langdell had talked of chemistry,
physics, zoology, and botany as disciplines allied to the law, realists talked of economics and
sociology not merely as allied disciplines but as disciplines which were in some sense part
and parcel of the law." Id. at 87 cf. infra text accompanying notes 262-63.
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substitute its opinion for legislative judgment in the economic area. 8
In the post-New Deal era, however, it was not long before progress
once again reared its head. While economic rights were demoted, personal
rights were elevated-a distinction never adequately defended outside a
series of assumptions indistinguishable from the distinction itself." Most
prominent among the arguments defending the distinction were those re-
garding the free marketplace of ideas. It was felt that "[t]o encourage
societal progress, it is important . . . to protect 'those liberties of the in-
dividual which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an
open as against a closed society . . ."5 The Warren Court best typified
this philosophy and in turn emphasized the protection of personal rights.
Professor Bickel observes:
The Justices of the Warren Court thus ventured to identify a goal. It
was necessarily a grand one-if we had to give it a single name, that name
S See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) ("[plrice control ... is unconsti-
tutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legisla-
ture is free to adopt"). See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW 127-28 (5th ed. 1980) (description of political climate in which the Court
reversed its due process approach) [hereinafter cited as CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW]. During this
period it was fashionable to perceive the states as social laboratories. G. GLMOiRE, supra
note 22, at 91.
" See infra note 75.
" McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 34-46 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see L. LUSKY, supra note 4, at 113. The concept of the "open
society" is largely indistinguishable from the preferred freedom position. It guarantees to all
the "fullest liberty of professing and discussing ... any doctrine, however immoral it may
be considered." Kendall, The "Open Society" and Its Fallacies, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 972,
972 (1960) (quoting J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE Gov-
ERNMEN'I' 14 (R. McCallum ed. 1946)).
Proponents point to the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments as containing
the ideals of an open society first articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Our com-
mitment as a society to openness is thus part of Lockean social contract protecting inviola-
ble natural rights: the rights of Englishmen initially won during the Revolution. See Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 661,
674, 682 (1979). But see Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. Rzv. 427, 459
(1981).
Advocates believe that a society remains open only if it removes barriers to free expres-
sion and individual goals created by either private or governmental actions that deny either
acceptable procedures or substantive rights. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 16-25, at
1063; Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 404-
05 (1978). An open society fosters man's "moral evolution." See Perry, supra note 13, at
292; infra note 153.
Proponents of the open society concept generally argue that as a nation we failed to live
up to our commitment until the emergence of the Warren Court, when, as noted earlier, the
"vacuum" became apparent and the Supreme Court was found "best suited" to act. See
supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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• . .would be the Egalitarian Society. And the Justices steered by this goal
• ..in the belief that progress, called history, would validate their course,
and that another generation, remembering its own future, would imagine
them favorably. . .. On such a faith. . was built the Heavenly City of the
Twentieth-Century Justices."
No serious commentator can ignore this long and varied legacy of
progressivist assumptions. Today various "fundamental values" dominate
the literature, continuing to make progressivist assumptions about the
nature of man, society and government. They assume "that constitutional
law is fundamentally the application of reason to public issues; it at-
tempts to create from the lawyer's skill of intelligent, conscious argumen-
tation a moral charter capable of ordering almost any aspect of human
conduct. '57 Such dreams die hard.58
The Supreme Court and Democratic Theory
Traditionally, a tension existed between the power of judicial review
and the recognition that we possess a representative democratic regime.
Today, that tension in fact has largely been dissolved by redefining each
term.5 ' The following analysis is offered.
Critics of American democracy often portend that its institutions,
most notably the legislative process, have failed. 0 No commentator, how-
ever, either has demonstrated that a majority of Americans equate legis-
lative inactivity with institutional failure, or has frankly confronted the
issue of legitimacy." What do they mean by failure? The failure alluded
to, I suggest, ultimately refers to legislative declination to adopt proposals
these commentators consider appropriate, wise, or just. Such contentions
" A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 13-14. Despite Bickel's later pessimism, he originated the
ideas that the constitutional text should be interpreted in open ended fashion and that the
Court was a "prophet and shaper" whose duty it was "to create moral principles and give
them substance." Id. at 11-42, 108-68; see Ely, supra note 13, at 54-55; Holland, supra note
52, at 1026-28; Purcell, supra note 22, at 532-33, 537-38.
6' Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174, 1176 (1979) (reviewing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
5 See G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 99.
" It is suggested that Raoul Berger's minority position preserves adequately the traditional
tension. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 10-14. These themes will be addressed in the final
section of this article.
" See Gangi, supra note 2, at 24-26, 41-43, 45 n.379. The institutional failure assumption
most often relates to the "vacuum," "better suited," and "cumbersome" arguments. See
supra text accompanying notes 4-7, 10-12.
" The problem arises as to how to count the majority in order to judge whether it has been
circumscribed. Is it a simple numerical majority, counted nationally, or one as envisioned by
Madison, where there is greater protection from majority tyranny? See Gangi, supra note 2,
at 59-62. Can we cite national polls in order to prove that the majority's will has been
thwarted? See infra text accompanying notes 271-72.
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cannot be equated with democratic institutional failure, because, with
some probing, they are defective in at least two respects: (1) Either rights
to the proposed legislation are claimed, the existence of which has not
been established, or (2) there is a presumption that the legislature failed
to reflect accurately the views of its constituents.62 These contentions
often mask the fact that what essentially is at stake is a disagreement
over personal preferences: what legislation ought to have been adopted
from the perspective of the critic in spite of probable majority
opposition."
Repeated allusions to democratic failure, thus, are no more than ad-
vocations of "results" that the advocate believes ought to have been pur-
sued. The failure of the legislature to pursue such results becomes their
per se criteria for judging democratic failure or institutional inadequacy.
The identification of democratic institutional failure with favored results,
moreover, often is hidden from view by unsupported contentions that the
results advocated are required by either the Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights." Such assertions, however, are
never concretely demonstrated without ignoring historical evidence to the
contrary. In this regard, claims of democratic failure eventually become
inseparable from current claims for judicial power, for they both attempt
to justify judicial intervention on the grounds that other democratic insti-
tutions failed to "progress" toward desirable results as rapidly and as
consistently as the majority of citizens ought to have demanded.e5 These
rationalizations do little to refute accusations of judicial usurpation or
illegitimacy."
The above principles may be more specifically demonstrated. Today
the literature is dominated by two primary groups: those urging judicial
action either to protect the democratic process, or to further define sub-
stantive rights. 7 Each school contends, however, that its rival school asks
the Court to impose mere personal preferences on the citizenry: an impo-
sition contended to be an abuse of its power." Both procedural" and sub-
" See, e.g., Mendelson, The Politics of Judicial Activism, 24 EMORY L.J. 43, 57-61 (1975).
" At least one commentator has concluded that even "process" questions entail personal
preferences. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063 (1980).
See Tushnet, supra note 30, at 1037.
*" See McCloskey, supra note 55, at 46-48.
See Gangi, supra note 2, at 46-47, 50-51.
'7 See Grano, Ely's Theory of Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance of the Political
Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 167, 170 (1981); supra note 55.
" See Gangi, supra note 2, at 32-33.
69 See Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and
Critique, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 3, 44-51 (1981); Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitu-
tional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 573-74 (1948). For example, procedural limitations include
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stantivel0 proponents redefine the original tension between judicial review
and representative democracy as intended by the Framers;71 both schools
delegate to the judiciary a level of power not contemplated by the Fram-
ers. The judiciary is elevated to the position of supreme public poli-
cymaker, completely reversing the New Dealers' hard-won battle against
the laissez-faire proponents.
The procedural and substantive schools in fact converge: both need
to substitute judicial intervention for legislative choices on public policy
questions.72 These positions converge because commentators rationalize
and logically explicate provisions of the text-now called ideals-instead
of historically establishing the people's adoption of the advocated prefer-
ences. Commentators often simply assume or assert that these ideals,
never before imposed, were present from inception.7 This approach en-
ables them to avoid the question of whether the preferences advocated
were either in fact present from the beginning, or are consistent with
traditional perceptions of what role the legislature, as compared to the
judiciary, was to play in establishing public policy within the competency
granted to it by the Constitution. In short, it permits them to circumvent
the legitimacy issue.7
4
As things now stand, the Court has renounced its right to intervene
with respect to legislative decisions on "economic rights" but presently
intervenes on matters of "personal rights. '75 This inconsistency has occa-
jurisdiction over persons and subject matter, or, existence of a case or controversy between
actual litigants. Braden, supra, at 574.
70 See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361, 1372-76 (1979). The courts'
use of substantive due process to legislate is evident from its discretionary use and develop-
ment of rules, principles, standards, and values. Id. at 1372. To the extent that equal protec-
tion is used to set a standard of moral worth it is unquestionably substantive. Alexander,
supra note 69, at 45.
71 For comments regarding the evidently similar positions of Professors Dworkin and Rawls,
see Leedes, supra note 70, at 1378, 1396.
7' See, e.g., Perry, supra note 13, at 304.
73 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 41-43; supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
74 See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDIcIARY 407 (1977) (certain contemporary
constitutional interpretations are inconsistent with historical fact).
71 Beginning with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and until Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Supreme Court often substituted its judgment for that of state
legislatures and even °Congress. CONsTIrUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 439. Relying on the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the Court, in essence, acted as
a super-legislature. See id. However, since 1941 the Court has maintained that the due pro-
cess clause does not pose an inhibition on the making of legislative policy regarding eco-
nomic matters. See McCloskey, supra note 55, at 38. For a recent decision giving effect to
legislative economic policy, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (statutory limit on liability bears rational relationship to Con-
gress' intent to stimulate private sector involvement in nuclear energy production). This
attitude on nonintervention by the Court does not, however, apply to legislation affecting
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sionally been defended on the hardly satisfying grounds that the former
was wrong and the latter correct." Issues of legitimacy are conveniently
converted into questions of results, with the accompanying feature of sup-
pressing relevant questions.7 What in fact changed between the laissez-
faire and post-New Deal periods were the preferences of the Justices on
the Court.7s The values constitutionalized by the Framers have been re-
placed by the preferences of a majority of Supreme Court Justices,
thereby redefining both democracy and judicial review.79
Judicial review and representative democracy, as traditionally under-
stood, have been conceptually ignored.80 The Court's original role of po-
licing the boundaries has been controverted into the institutional guaran-
tor of whatever preferences a majority of Justices decides upon.81 The
Court's original, limited and legitimate function as a 'nay-sayer' thus has
been transformed today into a judicial power to decide public policy."
non-economic, fundamental rights. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
71, 75 (1976) (to require consent of a party other than pregnant woman and her physician in
abortion decision is unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (fundamental
rights of personal privacy include abortion decision during first trimester).
7' See McCloskey, supra note 55, at 40-45. But see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 939 (1973) (non-economic rights should not be
granted special protection; the Constitution says little about either contract law or abortion)
[hereinafter cited as Crying Wolf].
7 Jurisprudence for the past century has managed repeatedly to suppress the question of
the common good, initially with respect to economic rights, and today, regarding the rights
of criminal defendants. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 49 n.404. Professor Voegelin has stated:
If. . . I can build a system, the truth of its premise is thereby established; that I can
build a system on a false premise is not even considered. The system is justified by
the fact of its construction; the possibility of calling into question the construction of
systems, as such, is not acknowledged. . . . [W]e now see more clearly that an essen-
tial connection exists between the suppression of questions and the construction of a
system. Whoever reduces being to a system cannot permit questions that invalidate
systems as a form of reasoning.
E. VOEGELIN, supra note 23, at 44.
78 See Crying Wolf, supra note 76, at 940-43.
79 See A. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 111-14; Hermens, The Choice of the Framers, 11 PREsl-
DENTIAL STUD. Q. 9 (1981); Gangi, supra note 2, at 10-14, 59-62; Holland, supra note 52, at
1032; Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional CommonLaw, 91 HARv. L. Rv.
1117, 1151-53 (1978).
80 Professors Lusky, see L. LUSKY, supra note 4, at 242, Ely, see Ely, supra note 55, at 404-
05, and Perry, see Perry supra note 13, at 327-28, attempt to preserve a tension, but it is a
tension of their own making-not the one constitutionalized by the Framers. Professors
Lusky, see Lusky, supra note 8, at 408 and Perry, see Perry, supra note 13, at 280, concede
as much. Regarding Professor Ely, see Professor Berger's devastating criticisms in Berger,
Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review," 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 87, 87 (1981) and Berger, Government
by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND. L.J. 277, 277 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Invitation]. To the best of my knowledge, Ely has failed to respond to these criticisms.
8 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 32-33.
82 See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-7
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This approach reconciles the tension between judicial review and repre-
sentative democracy by obliterating it. Such judicial power ignores the
Framer's concern about centralized power and legislative responsibility.83
It amounts to the merging of the powers separated in the Constitution,
coincidentally ceding to the Court the right to determine arbitrarily the
values contained therein. 4 Needless to say, no commentator has ade-
quately defended this contemporary role of the Court as being consistent
with self-government in the democratic republic constitutionalized by the
Framers.
Open-Ended Adjudication
The success of modern proponents of judicial power, however, re-
quires that some attention be focused on the means employed to support
it. They argue that the Constitution must remain "living," and that the
power to keep it up-to-date must be in the hands of the Supreme Court.85
They contend, more particularly, that, with respect to certain constitu-
tional phrases, "their meaning cannot be determined by reference to text
or history." ' Those components merge to create the belief that the con-
stitutional text, most often illustrated by the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses, must be interpreted in an open-ended fashion.8 7 A minor-
(1971).
83 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 10-14.
"' L. LUSKY, supra note 4, at 109-11. The position of the Court is that it is licensed to
disregard the interpretive meaning whenever the Court believes a different meaning is bet-
ter. Id. at 111.
8 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 19-23.
86 Grano, supra note 67, at 168-69.
87 See, e.g., Crying Wolf, supra note 76, at 945; see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 205 (1980). Contemporary courts create rights
by finding them to be fundamental to due process. For this development, see Cord, Neo-
Incorporation: The Burger Court and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 216-44 (1975). While contemporary fundamental rights are
usually not found explicitly in the Bill of Rights, or traceable to the intentions of the Fram-
ers, the Court finds them in the "penumbra" of the articulated rights. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Two criticisms of the position that the need for adaptability creates additional judicial
power also may be noted here. First, until recently, our society's need to adapt to changing
circumstances did not enlarge the judicial power. That need was thought to require, if any-
thing, greater judicial deference to the legislature when statutory proposals did not clearly
violate constitutional commands. Upon precisely that premise rested the progressivist cri-
tique of the laissez-faire court. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. If the need for
societal adaptability enlarged the judicial power, how can such claims be denied to the exec-
utive or legislative branches? Should they also argue that "circumstances" require greater
power than is constitutionally authorized? See Gangi, supra note 2, at 26-27.
Second, proponents of judicial power often assume, but seldom defend, an analogy be-
tween the common-law judicial practice of "making law" and the same power to create con-
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ity of commentators justify this approach on the rather narrow ground
that the Court should be "entitled . . . to seek out the sorts of evils the
framers meant to combat and to move against their twentieth century
counterparts."'8 Other commentators go further, perceiving the Constitu-
tion to contain words or phrases that are "general and leave room for
expanding content as time passes and conditions change." 89 Professor
Nagel provides this analysis:
[C]onstitutional values are stated at exalted levels of abstraction partly be-
cause modern sophistication, having liberated judges from the confines of
text and history, has liberated constitutional values from specificity as well.
The exalted nature of the values is also a corollary to assumptions about
constitutionalism itself: the Constitution, . . . [it is] suggest[ed], necessarily
must address the most serious public concerns, and must achieve a result
that can be seen as virtuous in order to be worthy of its fundamental status.
Any "imperfections" in the document must be remedied by interpretation."
Once the Constitution is so viewed, a variety of questions arises. First,
what is meant by a constitution? Traditionally, constitutions have been
conceived as setting specific limits and defining fundamental structures."'
stitutional law penumbras. The analogy cannot be sustained. The common-law power to
"make" judicial law "only interstitially," see Wolfe, A Theory of U.S. Constitutional His-
tory, 43 J. POL. 292, 303 (1981) (quoting Justice Holmes) simply does not address the views
of the Framers regarding judicial power, or justify overruling legislative choices. See Perry,
supra note 13, at 306-07. Professor Wolfe states:
Thus, the judge's role is legislative not only in cases where the legislature has not
acted and where past judges have made law, but also in cases where judges are over-
ruling legislatures which have acted. The distinction is important because "judicial
legislation" which has the effect of overturning only prior judicial legislation would
not modify the democratic principle of majority rule to the same extent as judicial
legislation which overrules the action of democratically elected legislatures.
Wolfe, supra, at 303-04. Today, the attempt to convert and expand the common-law judicial
power to constitutional proportions is defended by nine arguments. In my opinion the argu-
ments individually or collectively are not convincing. See supra notes 3-19 and accompany-
ing text.
88 Crying Wolf, supra note 76, at 929; see also infra text accompanying note 136.
89 Bork, supra note 82, at 13 (quoting Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3, 43 (1961)); see also Rehn-
quist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Thx. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976) ("living Consti-
tution" justifies judicial action when other branches fail to act); Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1162 (1977) (changing of the Court creates
uncertain constitutional protection). Allied expressions include the belief that constitutional
provisions "exist on a spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-
textured," Ely, supra note 55, at 413, or provisions that are "difficult to read responsibly as
anything other than open and across-the-board invitations to import into the constitutional
decision process considerations that will not be found ... in the Constitution," id. at 415.
But see Gangi, supra note 2, at 5-10, 13-14, 21-22; infra text accompanying notes 238-61.
" Nagel, supra note 57, at 1179-80.
" See GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 13, at 34.
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For example, the United States Constitution defines important relation-
ships: federalism, separation of powers, and amendment process. Once a
constitution's phrases are considered open-ended, wherein lies their lim-
its? Second, once a constitution is conceived of as open-ended, it no
longer provides limits for subordinate legislation, thus raising questions
of why even an integral provision, the amendment procedure for example,
should not also be considered open-ended. 92 Third, is it permissible to
change the intentions of the Framers regarding all provisions, or are some
provisions considered inviolable? Are there inherent limits with respect to
open-ended interpretation? 3
In this context, contemporary Court opinions have been described as
arbitrary, inconsistent and more coercive than persuasive.9 ' That we con-
9'We really are never told why some "phrases" may/should be construed in open-ended
fashion while others may/should not be. The only inhibitor on the endeavor appears to be
either personal preferences or drab imagination-one still influenced by an "historical" un-
derstanding of the words as they originally were used. Such reluctance merely appears
quaint, lacking in principle to someone with more imagination and/or sensitivity toward
"injus tice." See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST.
L.J. 223, 257-59 (1981).
What prevents Congress and even the Court from "adapting" the Constitution to mod-
ern times, for example, by substituting a four year term for the current two year term for
representatives? See Gangi, supra note 2, at 25 n.213. Should we evaluate legislative and
executive abuses of power by one standard and judicial abuse by another? Id. at 32. With
respect to the limits of adaptability, Professor Bridwell observes: "[Olne of our most out-
standing modern rhetorical questions [is], '[m]ay we thrust aside the dead hand of Earl
Warren?'" Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority
Rule?, 31 S.C.L. REv. 617, 643 n.114 (1980) (quoting Sobran, Taking the Fourteenth, 30
NAT'L REV. 283, 284 (1978)).
9' The idea of judicial adaptability of the Constitution is based on the common-law analysis
of Benjamin Cardozo. See G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 76-77; Cord, supra note 87, at 218
n.16. Professor Wolfe has provided both insight into and detail regarding Cardozo's role in
shaping the modern judicial role. See Wolfe, supra note 87, at 301-02. First, Wolfe notes
that canons of constitutional construction existed from the beginning, the emphasis falling
on "the ability of the legislature to adapt appropriate means to achieve its legitimate ends.
This adaptability is intrinsic to the Constitution: it is adaptation within the Constitution
rather than adaptation of the Constitution." Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
Second, "modern adaptation is not typically described as an effort to change the Con-
stitution. It is defended as a process of giving content to certain 'great generalities.' " Id. at
302 (emphasis in original). See supra text accompanying note 19. In this context, Professor
Wolfe notes that "it becomes possible to defend judicial review as no more than enforce-
ment of Constitutional commands, while at the same time providing a quite 'malleable doc-
ument': a container into which the desired content may be poured." Wolfe, supra note 87, at
302. The original perception that permitted legislative adaptability has been changed, how-
ever, to "where judges are overruling legislatures." Id. at 303. Professor Wolfe concludes:
"The distinctive aspect of modern discussions of rules of interpretation is ... that they
hardly exist. . . . To have a set of rules of interpretation would be to put excessive limit on
the capacity of the judiciary to adapt the Constitution." Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).
" See, e.g., Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contraction vs.
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tinue to talk about the discipline "constitutional law," I suggest, is sheer
habit and is perhaps self-deceptive.9 5 What in fact has occurred under the
open-ended constitutional interpretation of the Warren and Burger
Courts has been the imposition of personal preferences by particular Jus-
tices and their supporters.96 These preferences have been grafted onto the
"generalities" of the constitutional text, often under the misleading rubric
that they have always been there." The intention of such a constitutional
philosophy is to use the Court as the vehicle to take American society
where advocates believe it ought to go. Accordingly, even the narrowest
claim of a judicial power to adapt the Constitution has resulted in deci-
sions the Framers specifically would not have approved."
For example, notwithstanding that some proponents seemingly limit
the Court's power to adapt the Constitution to those "inferences from
values the Constitution marks as special,"99 their position is not tanta-
Abuse by Expansion, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 440-41 (1979). It is suggested that "[the]
unique experiment in government by judges called Warren Court activism," id. at 443, ex-
emplifies those neo-activist opinions that grew "more and more devious, sloganistic and di-
rected'to the human thirst for fairytales ... [the] purpose [being] to obscure (for lesser
minds) a raw exercise of judicial fiat," id. at 440-41.
" Today we should perhaps call constitutional law "Progressivist Advocacy Law." It is sug-
gested that there is little distinction in contemporary legal writing between constitutional
law and advocacy of personal values disguised in textual terminology. See Bridwell, The
Federal Judiciary: America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30 S.C.L. REv. 467, 472-74
(1979).
See Ely, supra note 13, at 10-11 (Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), was the imposition of the Court's value preferences on the state legislature).
' See Address by C. Wolfe, How the Constitution Was Taken Out of the Constitution, 1981
Meeting of the American Political Science Ass'n (Sept. 3-6, 1981) (mimeograph). As Profes-
sor Wolfe comments:
The Process whereby the Constitution has been taken out of constitutional law
consists of several steps. First, the Constitution has been emptied of substantive con-
tent. This has been done by severing constitutional provisions from their underlying
theoretical principles and by raising the meanings of constitutional provisions to such
a high level of generality that they are vague and ambiguous.
Second, the Constitution has been given a new content. This has been done gen-
erally by re-defining interpretation as "specification of constitutional generalities" by
means of balancing competing interests and by adding to the Constitution a new un-
written clause which may be called the "judicial necessary and proper clause."
Other, more particular methods have been employed as well (e.g., taking advan-
tage of changed meanings of words, substituting words broader or narrower than
those of the Constitution, misusing history, taking old precedents out of context and
investing them with a new meaning, and ignoring implications of one part of the Con-
stitution for another).
Id.
98 See infra text accompanying note 127.
See Crying Wolf, supra note 76, at 935 (emphasis omitted). In regard to the abortion
cases Professor Ely commented:
[M]y point is that the prior decisions, including those that have drawn the most fire,
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mount to the view that the Court is bound by the clearly ascertainable
intentions of the Framers. On the contrary, even this narrow power of
adaptability frequently entails modifying the original definitions of those
values from their previous interpretations.0 " Another group of commen-
tators cedes greater power, positing that the Court's constitutional role is
to establish values and principles not traceable in any way to the consti-
tutional text or historic milieu.1"'
Thus, despite many heated disagreements between them, proponents
of both procedural and substantive rights cede enormous power to the
judiciary.10 2 As discussed earlier, process-oriented proponents elevate
democratic values, perceiving that the function of the Court is to assure
the openness of the society,'0 s while substance-oriented proponents view
preferences as rights and tend to perceive the judicial role in more elitist
terms.'0 4 Consistent with open-ended premises, however, both positions
go "beyond an emphasis on structure, process and participation."'0 5
In disagreement with the above views, proponents of the traditional
perspective advocate that exercises of judicial power should consist of ad-
herence to the constitutional boundaries intended by the Framers. I con-
tend that the open-ended methodology today is simply the primary
means by which the Supreme Court majority, like its laissez-faire prede-
cessors, masks the giving of "constitutional stature" to whatever "results"
are believed beneficial. It has become the means by which the most recent
progress is incorporated into the constitutional text. What the Justices
"find" in the Constitution today are their own "values."10 Some com-
mentators still apparently believe they know or have a "vision" of the
at least started from a value singled out by, or fairly inferable from, the Constitution
as entitled to special protection.
Id. at 936 n.97.
100 See Bork, supra note 82, at 17. In his discussion of Tribe and constitutional rationalism,
Professor Nagel explains:
The preferred method of analysis is to examine text, history, political theory, social
facts, and other sources in order to identify a value that should be accorded constitu-
tional status. Because constitutional significance is not tied to specific language or
history, the value is necessarily both important and vague; hence, almost any issue
can have constitutional dimensions, and the value alone cannot explain case
outcomes.
Nagel, supra note 57, at 1178.
101 See Crying Wolf, supra note 76, at 946.
See R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 5-7 (1981) (ubiquitous constitutional issues
provide the Court with exclusive vehicle to effect changes on individuals and state agencies,
often without warning).
103 See Grano, supra note 67, at 177-78.
'0" See, e.g., White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary De-
bate and the "Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 171 (1979).
105 Id.
' See Ely, supra note 13, at 52-54.
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future.1 0 7
If we could rid ourselves of the illusion that law is some kind of science
-natural, social or pseudo-and of the twin illusion that the purpose of law
study is prediction, we shall be better off than we have been for at least a
hundred years.108
The Debate over Judicial Expansionism: Interpretivism vs. Non-
Interpretivism
The judicial expansionist debate today distinguishes participants by
employing interpretive versus non-interpretive terminology. " The terms
were initially employed by Professor Grey1 but were most frequently
107 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 13, at 295. Professor Gilmore states:
One lesson which we can draw from all this is that the hypothesis [that the future can
be predicted] is itself in error. Man's fate will forever elude the attempts of his intel-
lect to understand it. The accidental variables which hedge us about effectively
screen the future from our view. The quest for the laws which will explain the riddle
of human behavior leads us not toward truth but toward the illusion of certainty,
which is our curse. So far as we have been able to learn, there are no recurrent pat-
terns in the course of human events; it is not possible to make scientific statements
about history, sociology, economics-or law.
G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 100.
108 G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 101.
,o Brest, supra note 87, at 204. Brest employs the term "originalism" to convey what other
commentators call interpretivism and modern originalism. Id. at 205. This article's textual
discussion employs the interpretive-non-interpretive terminology because commentators
have employed it more frequently. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 123; see Brest,
supra note 87, at 231.
110 See Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 n.9
(1975). Professor Grey rejects interpretivism on the ground that it could not obtain results
he believes desirable. Id. at 714. Furthermore, he apparently argues that since contemporary
opinions have not employed interpretivism, it should be discarded on historical grounds. Id.
at 717; see Gangi, supra note 2, at 35-37. It is suggested that it is the "contemporary opin-
ions" decided by the Supreme Court that are to be treated with suspicion, not interpretiv-
ism. Furthermore, those commentators who concentrate on cases decided primarily during
the Warren Court period rekindle the flame by selecting only "correct" cases. They have a
very selective view of historical relevancy, including precedents that may expand, but not
contract, not to mention invisible canons of construction. See supra text accompanying note
18.
During the Warren Court era, the "incorporation" process (applying the Bill of Rights
to the states) accelerated. See supra note 87. The Court employed the "domino method" of
adjudication, repeatedly citing itself for authority to overrule precedent. See Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 950 (1965). In such
manner, traditional interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the criminal procedure area
changed. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (justifying Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (justifying
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), which, in turn, was used to justify Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 (1966)). Professor Amsterdam has been most candid about
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employed with the specificity added by Professor Ely, who defined inter-
pretivism to mean "that judges deciding constitutional issues should con-
fine themselves to enforcing values or norms that are stated or very
clearly implicit in the written Constitution.""'1 Noninterpretivism, ac-
cording to Ely, means that "courts should go beyond that set of refer-
ences and enforce values or norms that cannot be discovered within the
four corners of the document."1"'
Ely's definitions are inadequate. First, the "values or norms" of his
definition of interpretivism are indistinguishable from the "values or
norms" of his noninterpretivism definition, thereby blurring any distinc-
tion between them. Second, as Ely uses them, both terms employ "open-
ended" textual explication that is entirely speculative and historically un-
supported."' Third, neither term may be reconciled with traditional con-
cepts of judicial review and democratic theory.
Professor Alexander comes closer to illuminating an essential distinc-
tion between interpretivism and noninterpretivism.1 4 He states that in-
terpretivists believe "courts should overturn the actions of the democratic
institutions of government only when the actions contravene a constitu-
tional command properly interpreted.""' He then divides remaining ap-
proaches to interpretation into three subcategories of noninterpretivism,
each, one step further removed from the interpretive definition: 1) Neo-
interpretivism holds "that some of the constitutional commands,. . . are
empty vessels and delegate to the courts the job of supplying the values
required to flesh out the commands.""'  This position requires that "the
proper source for the requisite values is the Constitution itself, or rather
those values that lie behind and explain the more specific values that in-
terpretivism reveals. ' 1 7 2) Quasi-interpretivism moves further away from
such criticism of the Warren Court: "[s]killful domino players have a prescient purpose in
the moves they make, however arbitrary these may seem to an observer lacking knowledge
of their hidden pieces or their game plan." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 351 (1974). My opinion is quite different. The focus of the
constitutional scholar is on intentions; no human being can know the future, and remarks
such as Amsterdam's reveal that such scholar's ideological disposition is no different in prin-
ciple from the laissez-fairists'.
" Ely, supra note 55, at 399 (emphasis added).
11 Id. (emphasis added).
"1 See Grano, supra note 67, at 171. Other commentators point to the fact that Ely's own
support for judicial intervention in freedom of expression and equal protection cases is not
consistent with the distinctions he espouses. See, e.g., Perry, Interpretism, Freedom of Ex-
pression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 270-75 (1981).
14 See Alexander, supra note 69, at 9.
115 Id. (emphasis in original). Alexander does not specifically label that position "interpreti-
vism" but instead questions the meaning of "interpretation." Id. at 5-9.
"I See id. at 10.
7 Id. It is suggested that even with respect to neo-interpretivism, Professor Alexander rec-
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neo-interpretivism because here "the values necessary to flesh out the
non-interpretive constitutional commands need not be tied closely to val-
ues explicitly recognized in the interpretive provisions."' 18 3) "Pure
noninterpretivism is a position that posits judicial authority to invalidate
the actions of democratic institutions based on norms that may be clearly
extraconstitutional."" 9
Nevertheless, Professor Perry has made the most significant contri-
bution to clarifying the issues upon which the use of interpretive-non-
interpretive terminology turns. Perry equates the terms with conceptions
of judicial review, and specifically identifies the "legitimacy of non-inter-
pretive review [as] the central problem of contemporary constitutional
theory."'12 0 He describes the Constitution as consisting "of a complex of
value judgments the Framers wrote into the text of the Constitution and
thereby constitutionalized."'' According to Perry two categories exist.
The first "category of judgments" relates to the "structure of American
government," namely, the division and separation of powers. 2 2 The sec-
ond category "specifies certain aspects of the relationship that shall exist
between the individual and government.' '
23
Interpretive review, as Perry defines it, "ascertains the constitution-
ality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the value judgments
of which the Constitution consists," placing emphasis on the determina-
ognizes an implicit power of the Court to go beyond what the Framers originally understood
those values to mean.
118 Id,
"19 Id. Professor Alexander notes, however, that "Ely discovers the value of 'broad partici-
pation in the processes and distributions of government'" without being able to "cite any
provision in the Constitution that. . . conflicts with the democratic institutions' definition
of such participation." Id. (quoting J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980)). Alexander
labels Ely's position therefore as "neo-interpretivism," a subdivision of non-interpretivist
review. I concur. Alexander also notes that both neo- and quasi-interpretive are similar to
Brest's "moderate originalism." Id. at 10 n.26. Again, I agree. All three may be distinguished
from his interpretivism. Alexander comments that quasi- and neo-interpretivism are
"noninterpretivist with respect to substantive values, but interpretivist with respect to the
authority to seek out non-interpretivist values and with respect to having . . . particular
. . . provisions in the Constitution on which to hang all holdings of unconstitutionality." Id.
at 10. Apparently, this means that a double standard exists regarding property rights versus
personal rights, or structure versus rights. The latter would include extra-constitutional val-
ues such as privacy, as well as, expanding rights, such as the exclusionary rule. Such posi-
tions are more revealing of liberal ideology than scholarly consistency. See Parker, supra
note 92, at 253-57. In any event, in my opinion, Alexander correctly places Tribe in this
category. Id. at 10 n.27.
'2o Perry, supra note 113, at 263.
... Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
"22 Id. at 264.
123 Id.
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tion of the "character" given the value judgment by the Framers. 24
Noninterpretivism, Perry maintains, occurs when the Supreme Court de-
termines "constitutionality by reference to a value judgment other than
one constitutionalized by the Framers.""115 Perry asserts that from the
interpretivists' perspective "all [such] noninterpretive review is illegiti-
mate."' 0 He concurs with the interpretivist assessment to the extent that
he agrees that "[t]he decisions in virtually all modern constitutional cases
of consequence .. . cannot plausibly be explained except in terms of
noninterpretive review, because in virtually no such case can it plausibly
be maintained that the Framers constitutionalized the determinative
value judgment.' 127
Perry further clarifies the issue. Unlike other noninterpretivists, he
believes that "nothing [is achieved] by pretending that interpretivism is
not a forceful theory,"'' 2 and that, it simply will not be tolerated either to
misrepresent or to fail to understand adequately the interpretivist posi-
tion.12 9 Perry then carefully states and rebuts several criticisms currently
lodged by other commentators against interpretivists. First, to the asser-
tion that interpretivists have unrealistic majoritarian assumptions on the
electoral accountability of legislative and executive branches, Perry re-
sponds by emphasizing that such bodies are accountable, and by de-
emphasizing their "degree of responsiveness."' 30 The judiciary, he adds, is
"not electorally accountable at all."' l ' Second, Perry rejects as unsup-
"2 Id. Perry also mentions that such a judgment need not be explicitly contained in "some
particular provision" or the "overall structure." Id. Berger similarly points out that neither
judicial review nor separation of powers is explicitly contained in the constitutional text.
See Gangi, supra note 2, at 11-12.
12 Perry, supra note 13, at 264 (emphasis added). Perry concedes that "the Court may
explain its decision with rhetoric designed to create the illusion that it is merely 'interpret-
ing' or 'applying' some constitutional provision." Id. at 264-65. Elsewhere, he adds that
there is "no harm" in such deception "as long as the justice candidly admits that he or she
does mean not that the action offends the original understanding of the clause (the value
judgment constitutionalized by the Framers), but that it contravenes the Court's developing
equal protection doctrine." Id. at 350-51 n.272.
I would certainly consider it a solid contribution to the debate if the Court did what
Perry suggests. Indeed, I would like to point out that Perry contends both, that the Court is
to be entrusted with our "moral evolution," see id. at 291-92, and that almost all knowledge-
able individuals, including the justices, know that it is not the intentions of the Framers
they are relating. Thus, for Perry, violations of such a fundamental moral principle as lying
should have long ago been abandoned. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 46-47.
I" Perry, supra note 113, at 265.
"I Id.
n Id. at 278.
KU See id. at 278-84.
o Id. at 279.
's' Id. at 280 (emphasis in original).
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portable attempts to equate interpretivism with literalism.' s Third, and
equally unfounded, according to Perry, is the noninterpretivist argument
that the Constitution should be "construed broadly."' 3 Perry observes
that this argument fails to consider that there is a distinction between
power granting and power limiting clauses, and at most McCulloch con-
stitutes an admonishment to the courts to defer to legislative choices.1
3 4
Fourth, Perry rejects the belief that the Framers never intended to con-
stitutionalize particular value meaning in various clauses but instead left
it to the Court to redefine those values consistent with evolving percep-
tions. Perry maintains that there is no evidence to support such a posi-
tion. '35 He adds: "most political practices banned by the Supreme Court
in human rights cases, including freedom of expression and equal protec-
tion cases, cannot plausibly be characterized as simply modern analogues
of past, constitutionally banned practices."' 36 Perry admonishes:
Those who seek to defend noninterpretive review-'judicial activism'-do it
a disservice when they resort to implausible textual or, more commonly, his-
torical arguments; nothing is gained but much credibility is lost when the
case for noninterpretive review is built upon such frail and vulnerable
reeds."3
Perry further maintains that the only possible justification for non-inter-
pretive review must be functional 8" because "the implications of inter-
,32 Id. at 280-81.
"33 Id. at 282. Perry points out, as has Berger, that Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-20 (1819), has been abused by modern proponents of
judicial power. Perry, supra note 113, at 283. The emphasis in Marshall's opinion should fall
on judicial deference to exercise of legitimate legislative power. See R. BERGER, DEATH PEN-
ALTIEs: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 67 (1982); R. BERGER, supra note 74, at
373-79; see also infra notes 247-48 & accompanying text.
"' Perry, supra note 113, at 282-83.
's' Id. at 297-98. Berger has been very critical of judicial power proponents who substitute
"speculation" for evidence. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 7 & nn. 57-65.
IS Perry, supra note 113, at 301 (emphasis in original).
,37 Id. at 275.
8 Id. Professor Perry sets forth his criteria for functional justification:
If noninterpretive review also serves a crucial governmental function that no other
practice can realistically be expected to serve, and serves it in a manner that accom-
modates the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, that function consti-
tutes the justification for [non-interpretive review].
Perry, supra note 13, at 282 (footnote omitted).
Perry's formulation of the criteria above differs somewhat from his statement in his
previous article. Perry, supra note 113, at 275. Preceding the text quoted, Perry noted that
"there is likewise no airtight textual or historical justification for most interpretive review."
Perry, supra note 13, at 282 (emphasis in original). This unexplained comment constitutes
Perry's first curve ball. In effect, it hints that even traditional judicial review may not have
been intended by the Framers. Perry does not square that judgment with an earlier one,
that "[n]o contemporary constitutional theorist ... seriously disputes the legitimacy of in-
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1983
pretivism are so severe," meaning that they would require the overruling
of most Supreme Court cases. 139
Perry's justification of noninterpretive judicial review lies in his at-
tempt to establish the Supreme Court as serving "a crucial governmental
function that no other practice can realistically be expected to serve,"'' 0
and to demonstrate that the Court "serves [that function] in a manner
that accommodates the principle of electorally accountable policy-
making." '
Regarding the first part of the justification, Perry assigns to the
terpretive review." Perry, supra note 113, at 265; see also Perry, supra note 13, at 334-35.
He may be alluding to those who claim to be interpretivists, for example, Ely, Bork, and
Rehnquist.
Perry, supra note 113, at 292. Perry adds:
Interpretivism necessitates the conclusion, given the original understandings of the
first and fourteenth amendments, that most "first amendment" doctrine-much of
which is revered even by those quick to criticize most other constitutional doctrines
wrought by the modern Court-is the tainted fruit of noninterpretive review and thus
illegitimate.
Id. I do not review Perry's effort to show that other noninterpretivist justifications have
failed, namely those proposed by Professors Grey and Ely, id. at 266-75, 301-17, or Perry's
assertion that Professor Bork's and Justice Rehnquist's alleged interpretivist positions are
inconsistent with their positions on freedom of expression and desegregation, id. at 277-78,
290-96. Finally, Perry describes Berger as a "consistent interpretivist," but one who recoiled
from the logical necessity of having to overrule Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), id. at 293-94, and Bork, who, according to Perry, inconsistently defends the ruling in
Brown, id. at 294-95. See also Perry, supra note 13, at 296-301. But see Gangi, supra note 2,
at 38 n.318, 50-52, 57 n.448; R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 82-83 n.29.
My own view is that states should first begin to shore up items of concern that are
subjects of federal constitutional retrenchment. Second, Professor Berger's work further
reveals the need for an amendment prohibiting state discrimination on the basis of race
with respect to school attendance, miscegenation and serving on grand juries. See Gangi,
supra note 2, at 4-5. Third, while courts may not strike down legislation on the basis of
morality and/or wisdom, they should defer to the legislature where the authority may be
doubtful. See Address by C. Wolfe, supra note 97, at 23.
'" Perry, supra note 13, at 282; see supra text accompanying note 138. At least with respect
to what he terms "human rights cases," Professor Perry asserts that the function of non-
interpretive review is to maintain an accommodation between our commitment to
electorally accountable policymaking while struggling simultaneously to discover right an-
swers to basic political-moral problems. Id. at 295. Included in the term "human rights
cases" are freedom of expression cases, equal protection cases, id. at 280, freedom of religion
cases, and cases involving administration of the criminal law, id. at 317.
41 Id. at 282. It is suggested that Professor Perry's position amounts to nothing more than
stating that, since his accommodation function "works," it is constitutional. The desired
results are obtained, and that fact legitimizes non-interpretive review. See supra text ac-
companying note 9. On the contrary, an interpretivist should reject this position on the
ground that the Framers intended the Court's constitutional function to be solely the polic-
ing of constitutional boundaries. See infra text accompanying note 152. It is submitted also
that Perry's judgment "that function constitutes the justification for the practice," Perry,
supra note 13, at 282, is extrinsic to Professor Perry's definition of noninterpretive review.
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Court the function of prophecy." 2 This function falls to the judiciary be-
cause "electorally accountable policymaking institutions are not well
suited to deal with such issues in a way that is faithful to the notion of
moral evolution, and, therefore, to our religious understanding of our-
selves." 43 Only from the perspective of that function do Supreme Court
decisions over the past 100 years make sense, as "an organic political de-
velopment in response" to the failure of other branches. " The Court
transcends "established moral conventions" and enables us to maintain
our commitment to democracy as well as "to struggle incessantly to see
beyond, and then to live beyond, the imperfections of prevailing moral
conventions."1 ' Whatever prevailing conventions exist, Perry argues, we
are "open as a society to the possibility that there are right answers to
political-moral problems. In any event, we should be open to that
possibility. 1 48
Having established the Court's function, that of prophecy, Perry then
attempts to reconcile that function with electoral accountability. 7 While
in the past the Court has given wrong answers, that fact should not lead
to total rejection of the Court's function as described.1 4 1 Perry contends,
142 See Perry, supra note 13, at 291. Professor Perry states: "[judicial review represents the
institutionalization of prophecy. The function ... is to call the American people-actually
the government, the representative of the people-to provisional judgment." Id.
113 Id. at 293. According to Professor Perry, the "fundamental political-moral" issues with
which the Court has had to grapple in recent years include racism, sexism, capital punish-
ment, and human sexuality. Id. Perry suggests that the executive and legislative branches
do not deal adequately with the problems because members of these branches are more
concerned with reelection. Id.
1" Id. at 293-94. This argument, of course, reflects the "vacuum" and "best-suited" posi-
tions discussed elsewhere. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 22-33. In Perry's view it is the Court's
function to provide the "right answers to the fundamental political-moral problems that
confront [each] generation." Perry, supra note 13, at 312.
,' Perry, supra note 13, at 294-95.
,46 Id. (emphasis in original); With respect to this "open society" symbol, upon which I
believe Perry is heavily dependent, see supra note 55.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
1" Perry, supra note 13, at 309-10, 313. Perry argues that a right answer is "evidenced, in
part at least, by its location at a point of convergence among a variety of moral systems." Id.
at 305. Unlike the skeptics of our generation, he believes man has experienced moral growth.
He states, for example, that man "is not 'finished' . . . [r]ecognizing Man's openness means
admitting he is . . . not (yet?) finished, absolute, definitive." Id. at 300 n.80 (quoting R.
PANIHKAR, MYTH, FArH AND HERMENEUTICS 208 (1979)); cf. supra notes 37 & 57 and accom-
panying text. Perry concludes that while the Court could not justify decisions on "a single
moral system to resolve moral problems . . . [it] can explain and justify a policymaking
institution . .. that resolves moral problems not simply by looking backward to the sedi-
ment of old moralities, but ahead to emergent principles in terms of which fragments of a
new moral order can be forged." Perry, supra note 13, at 307. Elsewhere he adds:
My own view is that noninterpretive review in most substantive due process
cases ... mainly consists of right answers to the questions the courts have addressed.
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however, that the moral decisions of the Court must ultimately be ratified
by the legislature.' 9
Perry unquestionably contributes to the quality of debate surround-
ing judicial expansionism. First, because of his principled explication of
the interpretive-non-interpretive terminology, free of historical self-de-
ception, two modes of judicial review clearly come into view: "traditional"
(interpretive) and "modern" (noninterpretive). 50 Furthermore, Perry
confirms that traditional judicial review has dominated much of our his-
tory and most clearly reflects historiographical materials as best we know
them with respect to the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment.'
Modern judicial review, on the other hand, goes beyond the values consti-
tutionalized by the Framers of the respective documents. The symbol of
judicial review throughout our history comes closest to the traditional (in-
terpretive) mode. It has limited scope. The Supreme Court power was
primarily intended to police constitutional boundaries, and is, at most, a
These answers approach or even reach an emergent point of convergence among a
variety of systematic moral theories. This is not necessarily to say that the judiciary
has given answers for which there is a present "consensus" among the American peo-
ple, since the moral sensibilities of the pluralistic American polity typically lag be-
hind, and perhaps are more fragmented than, the developing insights of moral philos-
ophy and theology.
Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
While concerns for economy do not permit a detailed examination, it should be pointed
out that Perry demonstrates elsewhere weaknesses in natural law, progress and the use of
myth and symbols.
1,, Perry, supra note 13, at 331-52. According to Professor Perry therefore, if Congress fails
to limit its jurisdiction, Supreme Court decisions then are held to be authoritative.
Perry recognizes that what the Court does presently in non-interpretive review is "coer-
cive." Id. at 325. He rejects three arguments often put forth by other noninterpretivists
claiming to have reconciled contemporary non-interpretive judicial review with electoral ac-
countability: (1) the people have consented to non-interpretive review, id. at 328; (2) the
possibility exists of amending the Constitution to negate court decisions, id. at 328-30; and
(3) there exists the possibility of expanding the number of justices, id. at 330.
Perry takes the position that his effort to reconcile accountability with the prophetic
judicial function he describes is applicable "only [to] noninterpretive review." Id. at 335.
"My position is not that Congress may use its jurisdiction-limiting power as a means of
preventing the federal judiciary from enforcing value judgments constitutionalized by the
Framers." Id. at 334.
I assume Perry means that Congress could not remove jurisdiction (a) with respect to
"the structure of American Government," see supra text accompanying note 128, specifi-
cally meaning federalism and separation of powers cases, or (b) if the removal evinced dimi-
nution of rights below those constituted by the Framers, for example, with respect to free-
dom of speech and equal protection. See Perry, supra note 113, at 284-97.
'" These terms also have been used by Professor Wolfe, see Address by C. Wolfe, supra
note 97. Therefore, when referring to Professor Wolfe's definitions, the words "modern" and
"traditional" will be placed in quotation marks.
"' Perry, supra note 113, at 284-97.
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negative power: the Court plays the role of naysayer.'52 Similarly, Perry
implicitly supports Berger's contention that the judiciary has usurped the
amendment power. " '
Second, Perry contends that all prior attempts to justify modern
(non-interpretive) judicial review have failed adequately to meet the
counter-arguments of its traditional (interpretive) opponents.'" Not only
does he agree that the latter is a viable theory, but he concretely and
convincingly rejects several unsupportable modern (non-interpretive) ar-
guments against it.' 65
Third, Perry implicitly links the "traditional" and "modern" modes
of judicial review to clearly discernible intentions, thereby linking "tradi-
tional" review with the aforementioned historiographical materials.'"
Perry also acknowledges that where intentions cannot be ascertained, or
where there is an absence of conclusive materials, even "traditional" re-
view permits some judicial discretion regarding constitutional adjudica-
tion."5 7 For this reason I would suggest that intentionalist/nonintentional-
ist replace interpretive/non-interpretive terminology. The former ter-
minology more precisely conveys the difference between the two contem-
porary positions on the proper scope of judicial review.158
Fourth, Perry's own justification for "modern" (pure non-interpre-
tive/pure non-intentionalist) judicial review demonstrates his need to
utilize all the symbols elsewhere identified." Insofar as he does so, Perry
is open to interpretivist rebuttal.
'6 However, even during its laissez-faire period, when the Court confined itself to the role
of naysayer, that role was not completely free from the infusion of personal values.
'" Compare Perry, supra note 13, at 266-317 with Berger, Government by Judiciary: Some
Countercriticism, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1125, 1126-31 (1978).
Perry concedes that the prior and prominent non-interpretive justifications advanced
by Ely, Dworkin, Bork, and Rehnquist have failed. Although Perry assumes his "functional
justification" is sufficient to legitimize non-interpretive review, see Perry, supra note 13, at
275, his own analysis points out that other noninterpretivists have based their "constitu-
tional" decisionmaking upon personal preferences and failed to label them as such. Id. at
266-317. All that remains is Perry's "justification" which, I suggest, is also a personal prefer-
ence. Indeed, the supposition that a "functional" criterion would be able to justify such non-
interpretive review itself is a preference.
"4 Perry supra note 13, at 266-75.
' See supra notes 125-37, 150 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
"17 Cf. Berger, supra note 1, at 613 ("[I]f the terms of a particular constitutional provision
are ambiguous and no Framers' choices are discernible, there is room for judicial policymak-
ing."). This article takes the position that absent a clear constitutional value, judges should
defer to legislative assessments.
I But see Alexander, supra note 69, at 10 (differing terminology suggested); Brest, supra
note 87, at 204-05. For a discussion of Brest's idea, see R. BERGmn, supra note 133, at 183-
96.
"9 See supra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
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Concerning Perry's justification for non-interpretivist judicial review
the following objections may be raised: (1) Perry's justification is applica-
ble to all human rights cases but not to issues involving federalism and
the separation of powers."'0 Upon what basis is the Constitution thus ar-
bitrarily divided? Certainly, there is no historical evidence to support the
position that the Framers constitutionalized any such view. The only sup-
port for such a distinction rests on Perry's personal preferences: elevation
of human rights, yet fear of executive or legislative abuse. The Framers,
however, designed a Constitution entailing both, in addition to providing
for a limited judicial power."6 '
(2) Despite Perry's claim that his non-interpretive justification is not
applicable to the structures of American government, 62 the function of
prophecy he assigns the Court in fact constitutes a rewriting of the Con-
stitution regarding the separation of powers and the judiciary. There is no
evidence supporting such a role for the Court as part of "a complex of
value judgments the Framers wrote into the text of the Constitution and
thereby constitutionalized."'' 3 Perry's attempts to make the judiciary
eventually accountable indirectly by Congressional removal of jurisdiction
fail to address the issue. His proposal may be a good system, even better
than we have now, but the American people must consent to it. Until and
unless they do so by the procedure authorized, we are bound by the Con-
stitution as framed and ratified.'64 To the extent that Perry's justification
circumvents consent, his justification is inconsistent with traditional dem-
ocratic theory, and his efforts to assure accountability are irrelevant. In
this respect, compared to Perry's efforts, prior attempts to interpret par-
ticular constitutional clauses in open-ended fashion are child's play.
(3) Despite the immense sophistication of Perry's justification, its
pivotal point is to avoid results that he finds distasteful. This fact be-
comes evident upon Perry's implication that our democratic institutions
have failed or will fail. To equate constitutional law with beneficent re-
sults is fashionable with many of my most articulate colleagues. I join
Raoul Berger in steadfastly refusing to do so, regardless of how laudatory
those results may be believed to be. This dilemma is now, and has always
been, part of the agony of being a constitutional scholar.'6 5
1I0 See Alexander, supra note 69, at 11; Perry, supra note 13, at 280; see also supra text
accompanying note 149.
1"1 See generally Gangi, supra note 2, at 10-14 (discussing Raoul Berger's position). My own
views are discussed in the final section of this paper. See infra text accompanying notes 293-
313.
.. See Perry, supra note 113, at 261-63.
1 Id. at 263-64.
14 Cf. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment, Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REv.
311, 369-70 (1979).
' See Rehnquist, supra note 89, at 700-04; supra note 139.
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(4) Perry makes no specific suggestions on how we should go about
obtaining judges of the caliber he believes necessary. 1"s He does suggest
that interpretivists have an equal right to seek like-minded appoint-
ments.167 Are we to add to the appointment process potentially divisive
theological-philosophical issues? Would a Catholic who believes abortion
is murder, or a Mormon who believes in the importance of family, be dis-
qualified? It appears that the only qualification that makes judges better
suited to deal with moral-political policymaking is the fact that they are
not electorally accountable. 1" From an interpretivist position, expertise
neither confers power nor constitutes a defense against the charge of
usurpation.
(5) Perry's views bristle with ill-defined conceptions of contemporary
progressivist views, such as open society, man as evolving, and predictable
future. 169 How does Perry distinguish the truth of his assumptions against
the falsity of those previously held with equal fervor? Is not the truth of
his "converging" views nothing more than the shared opinions of the lib-
eral elite? Is that not convention in itself? We are entitled to know why
one opinion was once true but now false, while the new opinion will al-
ways remain true. From the intentionist point of view, abandoning origi-
nal choices demands a concrete and extraordinary amending procedure.17 0
(6) Presumably, Perry's canons of construction continue to apply to
federalism and separation of powers. Do they equally apply to the judicial
prophecy function in freedom of expression and human rights cases? 71
While Perry is correct in asserting that an interpretivist must be logically consistent,
Perry supra note 113, at 293, and that this position could lead to the reversal of Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Perry, supra note 113, at 293-94, it is possible to stop
short of this possibility and still remain a logical interpretivist by looking at Raoul Berger's
work for suggestions for constitutional reworking, see supra note 139. The non-interpretivist
position can also lead to logical inconsistency. For example, Perry accepts Berger's view that
the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the Bill of Rights, Perry supra note 113, at
285-87, yet he never suggests that this admission should require consistent noninterpreta-
tivists to overrule Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (fifth amend-
ment is intended solely as a limitation on the power of the federal government, and is not
applicable to the states).
1" See Perry, supra note 13, at 350 ("Noninterpretive review cannot serve the function I
have attributed to it unless the Court is staffed by persons capable of subjecting established
moral conventions to critical reevaluation. The justices need to be thoughtful, deliberate
individuals who are not wedded to a 'closed' morality").
107 Id. at 349.
1 See id.
Perry, supra note 13, at 301-18; cf. supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
170 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 66-67.
"' See Address by C. Wolfe, supra note 97, at 305; supra text accompanying note 91. Perry
is a very principled scholar; his fidelity to the Constitution-those parts he considers abso-
lutely essential-even supercedes his personal desire to accomplish results he believes to be
essential to morality and justice. He stated:
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(7) From an intentionist point of view, Perry's conclusions inevitably
lead him to expand the judicial power beyond the values constitutional-
ized by the Framers. In Perry's case, however, it leads, not only to the
LegisCourt, but also, despite his disclaimer, to a LegisChurch. 7 1 I say this
because, even under his scheme of electoral accountability, the Court
speaks first, and with the coercive power of the state.17 Thus, it would
violate the schema constitutionalized by the Framers.
In conclusion, however, I accept Professor Perry's thesis that most
contemporary decisions by the Supreme Court rest not on any "tradi-
tional" concept of judicial review, but on a modern one-one lacking his-
torical support. The latter and its progeny cannot be defended by any
criteria constitutionalized by the Framers.
Even if it were conclusively established that the Framers did not ordain the jurisdic-
tion-limiting power I claim Congress has, my basic point remains: noninterpretive
review, as a matter of democratic political theory, is legitimate in human rights cases
only if that power is conceded to Congress.
Perry, supra note 13, at 339.
I conclude two things from his statement. First, he is not prepared to go so far as to
offer non-interpretive justification for the exercise of judicial power that would permit ne-
gating essential constitutionalized values-democratic structure-that he considers at the
heart of the Constitution. Some intentions of the Framers are important to him. I wish I
could share his belief that his justification is consistent with those intentions. Second, he is
prepared to grant the Court power to make non-interpretivist decisions, resting ultimately
on citizen consent. Judicial imposition constitutes an injection of values to which the citizen
must consent. Again, I understand Perry's humane instincts, but I remain unconvinced that
they can be squared with the Framers' intentions. For Perry's earlier discussion of canons of
construction, see Perry, supra note 4, at 689.
"7 See Perry, supra note 13, at 291-92. He states, "[t]he Supreme Court is not an American
Chair of Peter, such that when a majority of the Justices speak ex cathedra on matters of
political faith and morals, they speak infallibly." Id. at 291. Further, it is suggested that it is
dangerous in today's world to underestimate the tendency to merge politics and religion.
See generally A. CAMUS, THE REBEL 112-33 (1956); H. DELUBAC, THE DRAMA OF ATHEIST
HUMANISM 77-187 (1963).
173 See Perry, supra note 13, at 308-09. Perry never comes to grips with the question of
where he gets the authority to propose a justification for a judicial power not granted by the
Framers. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 28-29. The prophets, for example, were granted au-
thority, and could not simply claim it for the good of the people. The following passage is
illustrative of that point:
I will send them a prophet like you from among their own people; I will tell him what
to say, and he will tell the people everything I command. He will speak in my name,
and I will punish anyone who refuses to obey him. But if any prophet dares to speak
a message in my name when I did not command him to do so, he must die for it.
Deut. 18:18-20.
NON-INTERPRETIVE REVIEW
II. THE BASIS FOR AN EMERGING CRITIQUE
Criteria of Relevance
Criticism of judicial power has escalated from the familiar accusa-
tions of misuse of history and precedent to the much more serious charge
of usurpation. Several developments have impacted on contemporary
scholarship. 174 Scholars have enormous difficulty keeping up with and
mastering only one aspect of one specialty. The problem is not simply the
enormity of available materials, or the further impossibility of studying
the entire history of each discipline, but the interrelationship of the disci-
plines. Only these disciplines represent an understanding of the totality
of realities, past and present.
All historical studies are executed by selection and omission of facts.
More often than not, such studies eventually are found deficient. 17 5 Nev-
ertheless, between explication and subsequent judgments of deficiency,
these studies are relied upon by scholars in other fields, creating in those
fields what are then considered criteria of relevance. Even legitimate in-
sights frequently become distorted or overextended by later practition-
ers.176 In fact, the practitioners of modern "science" (physics, biology, ec-
onomics) once believed they possessed the ability to explain the totality
of reality. 77 Each discipline eventually retreated, in large measure, to
study only its proportionate part of reality. In summary, who among us is
capable of mastering the insights provided by each discipline, applying
those insights to other disciplines, and also competent to judge, eventu-
ally, that the insight originally perceived is in fact defective or, perhaps,
has been unprincipally extended too far? This question is at the core of
the debate over the proper role of the judiciary under our Constitution.
Currently, a consensus on criteria to be employed in the examination
of historical materials is nonexistent. We are in the midst of a scholarly
reassessment, regarding both the appropriateness of various methodolo-
gies and the need to free ourselves from progressivist assumptions.178
174 See generally R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 5 (limited objectives of Reconstruction).
1 See G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 99-111.
M See generally M. ELIADE, IMAGES AND SYMBOLS 9-21 (1969) (how modern society changed
the form of man's noble images and myths so as to lessen his spirituality); H. JONAS, THE
GNOSTIC RELIGION Xiii-XVii (1963).
77 Cf. ANAMNESIS, supra note 30, at 143-46.
'18 See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 99-104; L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY
35-80 (1953); E. TUvESON, supra note 23, at v-xii; NEw SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 3-26.
Professor Tuveson notes "'[t]he real history of the idea of progress,' it has been remarked,
'is not written yet.' The reason is not hard to find. Historians who have written on the
subject have themselves been so deeply permeated by the progressivist faith that they could
hardly view it objectively." E. TUVESON, supra note 23, at 2-3 (citation omitted).
Perceptions of what is going on around us are that our times no longer contain the same
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Scholarship cannot recreate the past: some facts must be considered per-
tinent while others are best ignored. Scholars develop criteria of relevance
to distinguish the important from the unimportant. They also realize that
even significance regarding particular facts may vary from discipline to
discipline.17
9
The bane of scholarship, of course, is that it is practiced by humans:
unsupported assumptions are frequently made which affect the set of
facts a scholar may find important. For instance, take the scholar, con-
vinced that history has been evolving along the path of increasing actuali-
zation, dissemination, and expansion of liberty, who decides in 1946 to
study free speech during the revolutionary period. 80 When he examines
the historical data, our scholar may find it impossible to free himself from
his own assumptions and knowledge of those events occurring between
1776-1947. First, his criterion of liberty may lead to selection of some
facts without fully appreciating how other facts-those he "knows" even-
tually were abandoned-modified the former in practice. Second, his con-
viction that history reveals the unfolding of liberty could lead to limiting
his selection of facts only to those that he again knows will eventually
emerge victorious.
In short, it is quite natural, almost inevitable, once one is convinced a
progressive development is occurring, to smooth out the rough edges, to
demonstrate a natural continuity. History then takes on the characteris-
tics of a good novel. Revolutionary events become the seeds of liberty
that eventually "grow" and find fruit in what is or should be the public
posture in 1948.11 By the same token, such a perspective offers adherents
optimistic flavor prevalent during the last two centuries. I allude to the possibility of nu-
clear warfare, terrorism, potential long-range decline in the standard of living, world hunger,
environmental pollution, decline of the ability of the United States to influence world affairs
for the "better," and fear of violent crime, to name a few. All these experiences have already
changed our view of the world to a view less optimistic than our progressivist and New Deal
predecessors. These experiences are not outside the critique of progressivist assumptions
made herein. Indeed, they are part of the experience of reality which makes such a critique
possible.
Paralleling the experiences regarding progress in general, I suggest, is an increasing
skepticism with respect to judicial power to remedy injustice. Thus, the simple justice at
stake with respect to school desegration and public accommodations under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is not seen by most citizens as the same principle involved when they consider
busing or affirmative action. The phenomenon I describe is typified by "the Odyssey of Al-
exander Bickel." Ely, supra note 13, at 54.
17' For instance, what the economist considers unimportant, the theologian may find most
revealing. Different subjects require both different methods of inquiry and criteria to distin-
guish the important from the unimportant. See NEw SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 4-6.
8 See, e.g., Z. CHAFER, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 1-35 (1948).
"' See, e.g., L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION vii-xii (1960). Levy, after studying historical
evidence, "reluctantly" concluded that the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not envision a
broad protection of the freedom of speech from governmental prosecution. Id. at vii. How-
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a perfect vantage point from which to judge "reactionary" proposals. Who
may legitimately stand in the way of the inevitable? The possibility that
assumed criteria will affect the selection and interpretation of facts is
compounded when the words used, for example, "free speech," are the
same in 1787 and 1948. Historical events are not self-defining. Interpreta-
tion of mere words is inadequate. We must require further information in
order to determine what was intended when the words were employed.' s s
In order that historical studies be considered acceptable, at least
three criteria should be employed:
(1) The author of the work in question must attempt to understand
the principles enunciated by the historical figures as they themselves un-
derstood them.1 83
(2) The perception of opinions which developed after the period
studied must be exorcised from any purported reconstruction.'"
(3) Should different perceptions exist during the period studied, the
author must attempt to determine the relative extent of adherence to the
different perceptions.""5 Thus, regarding our earlier example, it is recog-
nized today that when "free speech" was used by those framing the first
amendment, they did not intend to supersede the common-law doctrine
of seditious libel.1 8 6
Should it be demonstrated that scholars fail to adhere to the mini-
mum criteria described above, their conclusions become suspect. It would
be necessary to examine the original materials with a less prejudiced eye.
ever, he went on to state that the Framers fashioned the language of the first amendment so
as to permit future interpretations to broaden its scope. Id. at xii. Therefore, Levy viewed
the progressivist attempt "to breathe a liberality of meaning into [the first amendment], in
keeping with the ideals of our expanding democracy" as legitimate. Id. (emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRA-
DITION 3-29 (1970) (stating need to study self-understanding of the American body politic so
as to truly comprehend the American political tradition).
'83 Professor Strauss observes that "[ojur most urgent need can then be satisfied only by
means of historical studies which would enable us to understand classical philosophy exactly
as it understood itself." L. STRAUSS, supra note 178, at 33; see also L. LEvy, supra note 181,
at viii-x (understanding historical principles made difficult by gaps in relevant evidence).
See generally R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 5-6. Nothing has distorted historical materi-
als as frequently as relating past events through present perceptions, or equally fallacious,
interpreting history from the presumed vantage point that one knows its direction or end.
See G. GILMORE, supra note 22, at 99-104; see also supra text accompanying note 56 (com-
ment that Warren Court believed future generations would validate its advancement of
"egalitarian society").
'" See, e.g., L. LEvY, supra note 181, at 313-20 (questioning actual impact of Lockean prin-
ciples on eighteenth century thought in America); Gangi, supra note 2, at 3-5 (discussing
Raoul Berger's conclusions on proper interpretation of the fourteenth amendment).
'" See L. LEvY, supra note 181, at vii-xii.
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Self-Interpretation Through Traditional American Symbols
Man is not and has never been a rock. Unlike a rock, he can articu-
late what he is about. Each in his own way perceives the various phenom-
ena around him. Man has always raised fundamental questions concern-
ing the meaning of his existence. The questions specifically raised, and
the answers each man renders, constitute, in effect, the story of his life as
lived in the concreteness and circumstances of his actions."' 7 Reality (the
objects around man) may stay the same, but man's consciousness (the
way he perceives those objects) itself changes and becomes a part of real-
ity. 88 Men, thus, are capable of perceiving the same objects around them
differently. 8 9 Societies also develop, raise, and answer questions about
their existence similar to those raised by individuals.'9 Voegelin calls this
process "self-interpretation." ' The study of the questions raised and the
answers rendered, individually and collectively by societies, may for our
purposes be called the history of self-interpretation. s1 Neither man nor
society, Voegelin explains, waits for science to explain life.' 93 Instead, the
earliest expressions of societal self-interpretation are to be found in
myths and symbols. 94
Myths'9 5 and symbols' are the earliest means by which man at-
187 Since each individual lives during a specific period in time, in a particular place and
society, the manner in which a person wishes to live out answers to these fundamental ques-
tions (Who am 1; Where am I going; What is true, etc.) may or may not be possible in his
particular society, during that particular period in history. See ANAMNESIS, supra note 30, at
200-05.
8 Id. at 165.
Id. at 158-59. Professor Voegelin makes clear:
[t]he differentiating experience . . . can be so intensive that the man to whom it
occurs feels transformed into a new being. The new image of the world resulting from
the experience can be misunderstood as a new world; and the process of change itself
can turn into a structural datum of reality that can be extrapolated into the future.
As that changeability that is experienced in participation mutates into images of a
changeable reality comprising the poles of participation, we have the roots of the
phenomena of metastic beliefs: The gradualistic idea of infinite progress in the time
of the world ....
Id. at 166.
19o See NEw SCIENCE, supra note 30, at 27-28.
1"1 Id. at 27.
192 See id. at 28.
193 Id. at 27.
I" Id. at 27-28. Professor Voegelin adds: "The symbols in which a society interprets the
meaning of its existence are meant to be true; if the theorist arrives at a different interpreta-
tion, he arrives at a different truth concerning the meaning of human existence in society."
Id. at 53.
185 "A true myth describes an archetypal event in words, .... while a 'sign' ... evokes the
event simply by being shown." M. ELIADE, PArERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION 413 (1965).
19 "The symbol reveals certain aspects of reality-the deepest aspects-which defy any
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tempts to represent to himself and those around him the truth that he
has experienced in his concrete existence.197 However, both myths and
symbols can change, be degraded,1 98 and abused. ""e A dynamic process is
at work:
A people that has given itself a set of symbols does not just leave it at that.
With the passing of time it develops its symbols; perhaps enriching or im-
poverishing them, perhaps giving them new twists, perhaps emphasizing
this symbol at the expense of that one, or even perhaps dropping old sym-
bols and replacing them with new ones."°
Kendall and Carey, authors of The Basic Symbols of the American
Political Tradition,' for the first time bring contemporary scholarship 202
and new criteria of relevance to bear on American historical experience.
They challenge existing perceptions in such an audacious manner that it
is difficult to ignore the problems they raise. The authors begin by
describing what they call the "official literature," the viewpoint that lib-
erty and equality constitute the very core of the American tradition. 0 3
More specifically, the "official literature" consists of the great body of
other means of knowledge." M. ELIAD, supra note 176, at 12; see also M. ELLE, supra
note 195, at 448-50 (use of symbols in various aspects of religion).
See ANAMNEsIs, supra note 30, at 93-97. Eliade writes:
Images, symbols and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; they re-
spond to a need and fulfil [sic] a function, that of bringing to light the most hidden
modalities of being. Consequently, the study of them enables us to reach a better
understanding of man--of man 'as he is,' before he has come to terms with the condi-
tions of History.
M. ELIADE, supra note 176, at 12. Eliade has stated that myths and symbols have the larger,
common aim of integrating the individual into society and the universe, an experience which
is important "not only to man's magico-religious experience, but to his experience in gen-
eral." M. ELIADE, supra note 195, at 451-52.
I" M. ELIADE, supra note 176, at 18 (degradation of images of man in modern society); see
M. ELADE, supra note 195, at 440-46 (how religious symbols have been degraded). "A myth
may degenerate into an epic legend, a ballad or a romance, or survive only in the attenuated
form of 'superstitions,' customs, nostalgias, and so on; for all this, it loses neither its essence
nor its significance." M. ELIADE, supra note 195, at 431.
'" See Tonsor, The Use and The Abuse of Myth, 15 INTMRCOLLEGIAm Rev. 67, 69-70
(1980). Furthermore, it is suggested that legal writers often employ or allude to symbols
without any systematic discussion of their nature, structure, or significance. See, e.g., Am-
sterdam, supra note 110, at 400; Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What
Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1, 83-92 (1978). Similarly, there is a
failure to explicate the use of the term "myth." Never is there an attempt made to probe
the structure, evaluate the quality, or note the distinctions of myth. See generally M.
ELIADE, supra note 176, at 17-21.
see W. KENDAlL & G. CAagY, supra note 182, at 24.
201 See supra note 182.
20I Id.
100 W. KENDALL & G. CARRY, supra note 182, at 9 & n.9.
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secondary writings which asserts that the Declaration of Independence
marks the beginning of that tradition and that there is a consistency be-
tween it and subsequent expressions of self-interpretation: the Constitu-
tion, Federalist Papers, and Bill of Rights.2 0 4 In light of contemporary
scholarship, the authors contend that the consistency assumed by the "of-
ficial literature" is extremely doubtful.2 0 5 To find such consistency neces-
sitates suppressing relevant questions and ignoring facts that did not
quite fit into the scheme assumed. 06
What then is a tradition? When does one begin? How can we tell? If,
as often proposed, the Declaration of Independence marks its beginning,
of what relevance, if any, is the 150 years of colonial history that pre-
ceded it? Have we perhaps had more than one tradition: a colonial tradi-
tion which ceased with the Declaration; a tradition commencing with the
Declaration and ceasing with the Articles of Confederation; that tradition
in turn ceasing with the adoption of the Constitution, only to be suc-
ceeded by another tradition following the adoption of the Civil War
Amendment?2 0 7 How should we proceed today to make such inquiries,
commencing as we do some 350 years after the founding of the first set-
tlement in the New World?
The authors believe the issues are illuminated by the fact that people
detail their experiences and express them in myths and symbols. 08 The
process, they note, is a continuing one:
The original symbols are likely, Voegelin teaches us, to be compact, that is,
compressed, by comparison with that which they will become with the pass-
ing of time-by which we may understand him to mean that the original
symbols hold within themselves the potentiality of development, unpredict-
able development one may add, in this direction or that one-much as the
child is a compact version of the man that he is to become, and becomes
'o See id. at 3-29, 119-36. The authors observe that other scholars made prior attempts to
detail the American political tradition, but assert that these attempts were inadequate since
those authors assumed what they were attempting to prove. Id. at 8-9 & nn.6-9.
2" W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 8-10.
10 See id. at 10-17. The authors point to five fundamental questions that the "official litera-
ture" fails to answer: (1) Why did the Framers oppose the adoption of the Bill of Rights?,
(2) Where did the reference to God go in the period between the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Constitution?, (3) Were the natural rights claimed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence identical to those rights later ratified in the Bill of Rights, and if so, why (1)
above?, (4) Why does the Constitution remain silent about equality, after having been as-
serted in the Declaration of Independence?, (5) Was the American Revolution fought to
secure for the Americans the traditional rights of Englishmen? If so, what were those rights,
and did Englishmen in fact have them? Furthermore, were they incorporated into the Bill of
Rights? If the answer to the latter question is yes, then why did the Framers oppose the Bill
of Rights? Id.
See id. at 7-8.
'" See id. at 17-24.
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that man by developing this potentiality or that one in this way or that. Put
otherwise, the original symbols are full of alternative possible meanings
which in due course may be seized upon, now this one and now that one,
and developed. Voegelin calls the process by which the alternative meanings
separate off from the original symbols, differentiation, a process the under-
standing of which is indispensable for our subsequent analysis of the Ameri-
can tradition." 9
Thus, the problem of tradition in the American political system parallels
its self-interpretation. 210 For if it is to be said that a tradition exists, there
should be a continuity of expression found in the symbols identified.
While exact meanings of original compact symbols may be somewhat
unclear, subsequent differentiation-additional detail representing
choices-helps us to grasp more clearly what was intended .21 The sym-
bols presumably exist in constant tension. 212 Conversely, should introduc-
tion of symbols be discordant with earlier ones, or if it can be established
that an earlier tension was redefined or abandoned or that meaningful
continuity does not exist among various expressions, then it may be said
that a tradition does not exist. Instead, there may be a number of
traditions.21
Kendall and Carey suggest two additional rules that might be helpful
when considering the question of whether there is one American tra-
dition:
(1) Begin the inquiry at the beginning.2 4 Beginning too early results
in finding symbols not associated with the people we seek.2 15 Starting af-
ter the beginning could result in finding symbols already differentiated."'
Thus, we could fail to understand what and why other potential choices
contained in earlier and more compact expressions did not survive, were
modified or ignored.
(2) If, as presumed, a people considers itself distinct from all others
in attempting to express its perception of truth, there should exist an
2" Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).
210 Id. at 22-25.
211 Id. at 24.
212 Cf. ANAMNESIS, supra note 30, at 103. "The life of reason in the classic sense is existence
in tension between life and death. The concept of the tension will sharpen the awareness for
this 'in-between' character of existence." Id. Voegelin asserts that the tensions are lost, by
moving to either of the poles. There is a danger of losing part of the truth knowable to
people, or of presumptions of knowing truths beyond human comprehension. Id. at 105-111;
see supra note 30.
3 See W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 25-26. Although the authors phrase the
question differently, it is suggested that the "official literature," the position that liberty
and equality mark our tradition, points to the phrasing used in the above text.
214 Id. at 26.
215 Id.
216 Id.
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illuminating correspondence between the symbols it selects and the ac-
tions it takes.2 17 Conversely, "[ulnless we can see a correspondence be-
tween the symbols we have in hand and the people's action in history, the
symbols we have in hand do not in fact represent that people, and we
must look a second time for the symbols that do in fact represent
them.,"2
18
The suggested criteria focus our attention on an enormous body of
raw materials-the history of a people's actions. Historical data becomes
crucial to our understanding of symbols. History is a factor not given ade-
quate attention today. Instead, discordant facts (actions) have been
shunted aside because they do not fit into the assumptions employed: cri-
teria assuming the progress of liberty and equality. 19 Kendall and Carey
explore four documents generally conceded relevant to a study of Ameri-
can history and conclude that there is considerable continuity among
symbols expressed as early as the Mayflower Compact, subsequent sym-
bolizations, and the Constitution of the United States.220 Whatever its
importance, the Declaration of Independence is certainly not the begin-
ning of our tradition."2
The development of traditional American symbols is relevant to the
subject of the contemporary role of the Supreme Court for several rea-
sons. First, if from their earliest moments societies develop a process to
express truths through symbols, then at least four questions come to
mind: (1) What are the symbols?, (2) How do we know them?, (3) Where
would people put them?, and (4) Who is authorized to change them?
Second, as noted, symbols are capable of change as well as open to
manipulation and abuse."2 One need only mention the phrases "due pro-
cess," "equal protection," or "free speech" to suggest that if clearly dis-
cernible intentions of the Framers constitute an authorized meaning of a
symbol, contraction or expansion may constitute an abuse. Similarly, if
judicial review meant one thing originally, 2 " and "judicial integrity" con-
211 Id. For example, today "Americans" consider themselves different from the "Russians"
or the "English" because they believe in different truths (principles), or at least rank them
differently.
218 Id. (emphasis in original). The problem, then, it must be emphasized, lies with us-our
ability to understand the symbols, not with the people they represent.
See id. at 3-10.
o See id. at 30-74; 96-136. These four documents are: the Mayflower Compact (1620); the
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639); the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641);
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776).
-" Id. at 66-67, 75-95. The authors assert that the Declaration of Independence has "been
interpreted in such a way as to cause a derailment in our tradition." Id. at 84.
2 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
* See Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty' in Those Clauses in the Federal
and State Constitutions Which Protect Life, Liberty and Property, 94 HARv. L. REv. 365,
366 (1981).
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veys something quite different today, it may well constitute a symbol's
manipulation.224
Third, a theorist may choose to study changes in a symbol's meaning,
or trace how the process of authorizing, promulgating and changing a so-
ciety's symbols moved from the hands of one institution to another. Can a
constitutionalist be as neutral an observer? I think not, and suggest that
such a distinction is what the current debate over judicial power is all
about.225
Historical materials, properly understood, are essential to adequately
comprehending a people's symbolization. In light of the above developed
criteria, it is no longer legitimate for scholars to infer hypocrisy or igno-
rance to the participants of an era because a discrepancy exists between
the symbol expressed by the participants and the actions taken under
that symbol. This approach, on principle, is defective for at least two
reasons:
(1) Assumptions of discrepancy fail to perceive how the people then
understood those symbols by substituting criteria developed later. In
short, it is projecting contemporary understanding retroactively to histor-
ical materials. For example, during much of our history "freedom of the
press" simply meant freedom from prior restraint.2 ' It will not do, when
researching the people's concurrent actions, to judge those actions or ma-
lign their intelligence by employing the contemporary "clear and present
danger" criteria. To proceed in such a fashion reveals the inadequacies of
the researcher and not the ignorance of the participants.
(2) Criteria of hypocrisy or ignorance cause the researcher either to
distort what was meant, or to attribute a meaning not perceived by those
who utilized the symbols. It is precisely by studying the people's actions
that we can better understand what those "symbols" meant.2 7 Moreover,
in attempting to grasp what the people meant by the symbols they ex-
pressed, it is illegitimate to discern that meaning by pursuing abstractly
the internal "logic" of the symbols. What the people meant by those sym-
bols can and must be discerned only by studying their actions. To put the
224 For example, there are those today who argue that the exclusionary rule is necessary to
protect "judicial integrity," see Bennett, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argu-
ment for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1129, 1136-37
passim (1973), whereas, what occurs is a redefining of judicial review and representative
democracy, cf. supra notes 59-108, and accompanying text (discussing generally the tension
between judicial interventionism in policymaking and representative democracy).
222 See Ely, supra note 13, at 53-54 (justices who "plead value-neutrality" actually impose
their own values); infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text; cf. Berger, The Scope of Judi-
cial Review: A Continuing Dialogue, 31 S.C.L. REv. 171, 193-94 (1980).
26 See L. LEvY, supra note 181, at 126-309; Perry, supra note 13, at 287.
*27 See W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 26; cf. Alexander, supra note 69, at 5-6
(meaning of symbols cannot be interpreted theoretically).
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matter bluntly, many of our historical studies are defective because we
often have failed to understand the significance of those actions."' 8 In-
stead, what we have done is to discuss constitutional provisions "logi-
cally," a standard defective per se, as well as potentially dangerous.229
Accordingly, much of the secondary historical literature today must
be subject to reevaluation in order to determine whether an author's "as-
sumptions" prompted selective choices of facts. To the degree that sec-
ondary literature reflects either of the two defects discussed above, it is
suspect and should be given little credence regarding the "history" alleg-
edly explored. 80 Each of us, of course, remains free to express personal
preferences, or, to put it in terms of my own criteria of relevance, to artic-
ulate our conscience on matters "thought most meete and convenient for
the generall good." 31 While confusing our conscience with constitutional
provisions may be effective in obtaining "results," it ultimately under-
mines the existence of scholarship. At a minimum, if scholars must ex-
press preferences, they are obliged to state them as such, without sug-
gesting that those preferences are part of the American political
tradition.2 32 Indeed, when the distinction between preferences and histor-
ical reality is not made, it is legitimate to press such advocates to prove
that the preferences they espouse have indeed been recognized.
Kendall and Carey concluded that among the primary symbols which
emerge in American government are self-government,233 the supreme rep-
resentative assembly, 34 and higher law, 33 not individual rights.23 6 These
'" See generally W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 3-10; L. LEvY, supra note 181,
at vii-xii.
"9 See T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 33-45 (1935).
See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 110, at 410.
Mayflower Compact (1620).
See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 181, at xi-xii (actual American political tradition was not
strongly libertarian).
111 W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 66-68. The one "'indubitable, inalienable,
and indefeasible right'" to emerge from the one hundred and fifty years preceding the
American Revolutionary War was the right of the people to self-government. Id. at 67
(quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights). The "rights of all individuals will be safest if first
the rights of the people are assured, and above all the right or rights of the people to govern
themselves. . . ." Id. at 66 (emphasis in original). It is the right of the people to modify or
abolish an existing system of government that precedes all others. Thus the "provisions of
the Virginia Declaration are clearly the core of Article V of our Constitution which gives the
majority of the American people the right in question." Id. at 67.
Once a body politic grows too large to discuss issues of common concern, a process of
representation must be developed. The process developed is intended to encourage those
best capable of making important decisions on human affairs to make decisions. See id. at
57. In day-to-day activities, therefore, it is the representative assembly which exercised the
people's right to self-government. It obtained the people's consent to do so, and it was held
accountable. It is the symbol of the supreme representative assembly that emerges as the
body entrusted with the responsibility to deliberate "on the delicate topics touched upon, to
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symbols have been authorized by the people as a whole and can be found
pass laws in the sensitive areas from the standpoint of freedom." Id. at 55. In short, in
governing itself, the people gave to its representatives the responsibility for making judg-
ments regarding the common good, thereby defining and balancing, in particular circum-
stances, often conflicting views on individual rights, duties, justice and social order. Id. at
56-60.
2" Kendall and Carey point out that the symbol of the "supreme representative assembly,"
discussed above, "at first blush" appears to result in "an omnicompetent and legal omnipo-
tent deliberative assembly." Id. at 53. However, as expressed first in Massachusetts, repre-
sentatives of the General Court (the legislature), when deliberating, were called upon to do
"that which is humane, civil and Christian." Id. Furthermore, there is "no hint of a sugges-
tion that the General Court is entitled to improvise when dealing with the question: What is
humane, . . . civil . . . and Christian?" Id.
The symbol of a "higher law" reaches its full differentiation in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights (1776). There the authors concluded that if the document is properly read, there is
a careful separation between the "sphere of government and the sphere of society." Id. at
73. The separation of the two spheres "in due course will become explicit in The Federalist,
of a Christian society with a secular, that is, precisely not religious, form of government."
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, while the legislature was considered supreme, "its
supremacy, its right or power, is simultaneous with its obligation to subordinate itself to
standards not of its own making-standards embodying . . . the truth of the soul and of
society as that truth has been made known to us by the great philosophers. . . ." Id. at 71-
72 (emphasis in original). In no sense should we assume by separation of the two spheres
that the authors of the Virginia Declaration or the Constitution "underst[ood] or inter-
pret[ed] themselves as less Christian, less committed to the truth of the soul and of society
as that truth comes to us through Revelation, than, say, the signers of the Mayflower Com-
pact." Id. at 72.
To conclude, insofar as deliberation occurred, its participants were not "positivists"
subject only to their own will. On the contrary, legislative participants were obliged then-
as in fact they continue to be today-to call upon and subordinate themselves to our philo-
sophic and religious heritage when deliberating on what is "thought most meet and conven-
ient for the general Good." Mayflower Compact (1620).
23 The right to self-government is not equivalent to individual rights but precedes their
specifications. See W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 59-60. The liberties often
alluded to in our colonial history were common-law guarantees primarily against judicial
and executive officials. They refer in large measure to those eventually contained in the first
eight amendments of the Bill of Rights. See R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 64. These com-
mon-law rights had well settled, specific and limited meaning. See Shattuck, supra note 223,
at 375-76; cf. R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 59-76 (Founding Fathers generally employed
common-law terms to create a "fixed" Constitution). In addition, the Bill of Rights was, to a
great extent, an expression of federalism. In the modern sense there simply were no rights
against the legislature. It " 'was conceivable to protect the common-law liberties of the peo-
ple against their rulers, but hardly against the people themselves.'" Berger, supra note 225,
at 177 n.41 (quoting G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 63
(1969)). Specifically, there were certain liberties that citizens insisted be written down and
absolutely followed by executive and judicial personnel. But with respect to rights "we
might expect to be guaranteed against legislative encroachment or violation . . . [there
were] escape clauses." W. KENDALL & G. CAR EY, supra note 182, at 52 (emphasis added); see
also Berger, supra note 80, at 124. "Each of the relevant guarantees is, so to speak, a verbal
parachute that from the standpoint of the official literature would reduce it to meaningless-
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in the documents representing the people's expression as such. It is sug-
gested, therefore, that only the people collectively, by processes ordinary
and extraordinary, are authorized to change the meaning of symbols, or
to abolish them and substitute new ones.
23 7
III. AN INTENTIONIST VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
There remains the task of enunciating those principles traditionally
associated with judicial power. The Constitution states that "the judicial
Power. . . shall be vested in one supreme Court, 2 38 and implicitly recog-
nizes judicial review. s Judicial review is a legitimate power authorized
by the Framers of the Constitution. They perceived it as a negative power
functioning to curtail executive or legislative overreaching.240 Since the
power granted is limited in nature, it is certainly abused when members
of the judiciary go beyond the authorized scope. The power of judicial
review, when properly exercised, serves to preserve allegiance to the Con-
stitution.241 It was intended to be the last institutional means whereby
the legislature was to be kept within the powers granted by the Fram-
ers.242 While exercising even this narrow, negative power of review, the
laissez-faire Court still managed to abuse it by basing its judgments, not
on what was intended by the Framers, but instead on the Justices' per-
sonal views as to what was beneficial economic policy.242 Today, the scope
of judicial review goes well beyond that of a naysayer; for the first time in
ness." W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at 52. The authors demonstrate that while
"liberties" were granted initially, each provided that exceptions and specifications were to
be governed by the legislature. See id. at 52-53. Individual rights against the legislature were
considered inconsistent with the right of self-government. Rights against the legislature
were unnecessary since the people themselves were the government represented in the legis-
lature. The function of the legislature was to make important decisions, balancing individual
and societal needs. Finally, absolute rights were imprudent because historical experience
indicated that situations would arise requiring exceptions to any possible absolute statement
of a rule. The granting of unqualified rights against the legislature would in fact jeopardize
the very ability of the people to govern themselves-the primary right-in changing circum-
stances. Id. at 48-72, 123-36, 143-54; Gangi, supra note 2, at 64-65.
287 See generally Gangi, supra note 2, at 10-14.
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
239 Berger contends that although the Constitution is silent as to judicial review, the Fram-
ers intended its inclusion, evidenced by language found in articles III and VI of the Consti-
tution. R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 355-56; see Gangi, supra note 2, at 11.
20 Gangi, supra note 2, at 11; see R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 305 n.25.
' See R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 304-05.
s See id.
141 See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-43 (1935); Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544, 555-56 (1923), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-58 (1905).
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our history, the Supreme Court initiates legislation.2 4 4
Judicial power applies the legislative will expressed in statutes to the
realities created by a "case" or "controversy." Judges were never intended
to initiate legislation;24 5 to do so legitimately they would have to be au-
thorized by the people. The Supreme Court, basing its decision on the
Framers' intentions, may find legislation to be beyond the powers
granted, but may never strike down legislation merely because it is un-
wise or immoral.""6 The Constitution is the standard against which all
else is to be measured. The Justices also have to be particularly cautious,
lest, by prohibiting legislative discretion, they unnecessarily limit the peo-
ple's ability to cope with changing circumstances. The Constitution
should not be abused by contraction, for to do so would inhibit its ability
to endure. This approach is what Marshall intended to convey in McCul-
loch v. Maryland247 -judicial deference to legislative means where those
ends or means are not clearly prohibited. " 8
The judicial power of review makes sense only in the context of a
Constitution with "fixed" meaning.24 9 To accomplish that end, the Fram-
24 See R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 305-06; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54
(1973) (extension of right of privacy); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966)
(breadth of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
245 See R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 86. Berger inquires:
What then is the proper role of the Court? It is not wrapped in mystery. Fearful
of the greedy expansiveness of power, the Founders sought to confine their delegates
to the power conferred. To insure that their delegates would not "overleap" those
bounds, the courts were designed to police those boundaries. No reference to judicial
review beyond that policing function is to be found in the records of the several con-
ventions; there is not the slightest intimation that the courts might supersede the
legislature's exercise of power within its boundaries.
Id. at 86-87 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
' See id. at 81. Berger draws a distinction that was also made earlier by Chief Justice
Marshall, then defending the McCulloch decision, that "an unwise law is not necessarily
unconstitutional." Id. (footnote omitted).
I'l 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). McCulloch contains the often repeated remarks of Chief
Justice Marshall that "it is a constitution we are expounding," id. at 407, a constitution that
is "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs," id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
346 R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 67.
When [McCulloch] came under attack, [Marshall] defended that he was pleading for
elasticity in Congress' "choice of means" to execute existing powers and denied any
"constructive assumption of powers never meant to be granted." Again and again he
repudiated any claim for "extension by construction" and flatly disclaimed a judicial
"right to change that instrument."
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). For additional details of Marshall's constitu-
tional philosophy, see R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 373-78.
1' Berger notes that in construing the Bill of Rights, reference should be made to the com-
mon law from which it evolved. R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 64 (citation omitted). "These
decisions reflect a fundamental purpose: common law terms served to delimit delegated
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ers used many well-known, common-law phrases "which required no ex-
planation."'5 0 It is to those meanings we remain bound; 5' only in such
context can the Framers' objective of a "fixed" constitution be realized.
This view was shared by those framing the fourteenth amendment. "
Why else would the Constitution contain the means, and the amendment
procedure, by which changes may occur, if not to provide succeeding gen-
erations the opportunity to evaluate the wisdom, or depart from the folly,
of earlier generations.
The preceding is the meaning of constitutionalism as has been tradi-
tionally understood. If it has changed, we are entitled to know who au-
thorized that change and when it occurred. The burden of proof is on
those arguing that, as a nation, we abandoned rule by consent and re-
placed it with rule by judges.25 3 Nor can that consent be assumed, or im-
plied, since "an opinion which is. . . to establish a principle never before
recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms."2 Modern
power." Id. (emphasis in original). This approach marked early decisions of the Court, see
id. at 64-67, and was understood, as such, by the Framers of the fourteenth amendment: "A
construction which should give the phrase ... a meaning different from the sense in which
it was understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would
be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the Constitu-
tion," id. at 67 (quoting S. REP. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 571-72 (A. Avins ed. 1967)).
'" R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 63 n.19; see R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 366-67. "The
Founders resorted to a written Constitution the more clearly to limit delegated power, to
create a fixed Constitution; and an important means for the accomplishment of that purpose
was their use of common law terms of established and familiar means." R. BERGER, supra
note 133, at 61.
"' See R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 62-63. Berger admits, however, that there may be
situations in which the Framers' intent is difficult to discern. See Berger, supra note 225, at
174-75. Berger states, "I consider that if the terms of a particular provision are ambiguous
and no Framers' choices are discernible, there is room for judicial policymaking." Berger,
supra note 1, at 613.
'" The Senate Judiciary Committee Report in 1872 declared: "In construing the Constitu-
tion we are compelled to give it such interpretation as will secure the result which was
intended to be accomplished by those who framed it and the people who adopted it." S.
Rm. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS'
DEATES 571-72 (A. Avins ed. 1967).
I" See R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 85. Compare R. NEELY, supra note 102, at 4-22 (dan-
gem of judicial legislation), with R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 249-54 (substantive due pro-
cess as government by judiciary).
"I" R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 45 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall, United States v. Burr,
25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693)). Berger adds: "A departure from accepted
practice cannot rest on mere speculation." Id. How can we have consented without ever
being informed that rule by judges was at stake? Are we to attribute a lesser standard of
disclosure than we would demand for purchase of a consumer item? Are we to assume that
the legislature can demand that the "buyer beware" maxim not rule the marketplace, while
the judiciary may take away the right of the people to govern themselves? See Gangi, supra
note 2, at 46-47.
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proponents of judicial power have not and cannot carry that burden.
Judges were never authorized to substitute whatever meanings they
wished for common-law phrases whose meanings were well-settled at the
time of their constitutionalization. 255
Opposition to contemporary judicial lawmaking, therefore, should
not be confused with opposition to judicial review. Judicial review is legit-
imate, judicial law initiation is not. Judge-made law, absent clear inten-
tions or expression of legislative will, is legitimate, while judicial substitu-
tion of personal beliefs for those of the Framers or legislators is not.
We are bound by the clearly discernible intentions of the Framers; no
other position is consistent with the Framers' specific anticipation. Sub-
mission to the clearly discernible intentions of the Framers is in fact
what distinguishes "interpretivists" from "non-interpretivists." For this
reason, the terminology of intentionists versus nonintentionists offers a
clearer perception of those differences. 5 6 In addition, despite the im-
mense sophistication and complexity of the nine arguments currently em-
ployed to justify increased judicial power, 5 7 these nine arguments fail in
their objective. Such arguments cannot justify repeated judicial usurpa-
tion of the legislative power and circumvention of the amendment pro-
cess. Moreover, current democratic theory apparently considers irrele-
' Berger stated that:
the words of the Constitution are not to be "extended to objects not .. contem-
plated by its framers." What was "not intended" was "not contemplated," and hence
was not authorized.... Then too, the burden is on one who claims power to show
where it "is enumerated in the Constitution .. " If there is no "peculiar" judicial
qualification for policymaking before enactment, it is not miraculously conceived
when judges sit in judgment on the statute.
R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 84-85 (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)). Berger contends that judicial policymaking contrary
to the intentions of the Framers, including the common-law meanings adopted, "is fore-
closed by the historical evidence." R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 85. He summarizes this
evidence as follows:
(1) the Founders' belief in a fixed Constitution of unchanging meaning, alterable only
by the people, not the courts; (2) the inferior place of the judiciary in the federal
scheme, deriving from the suspicion of the innovative judicial review by judges there-
tofore regarded with "aversion"; (3) the Founders' "profound distrust" of judicial dis-
cretion; (4) their attachment to the separation of powers and insistence that courts
should not engage in policymaking but act only as interpreters, not makers, of the
law.
Id. at 85-86 (footnotes omitted).
2"The intentionist position in principle is different from noninterpretivism, which today
dominates the literature. Still, it cannot answer all questions, particularly where the original
intentions are unclear, or where flexibility was "written in." For example, there is flexibility
for the legislature to legislate what is "necessary and proper." See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL
18; supra note 158 and accompanying text.
,5, See supra notes 3-18 and accompanying text.
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vant, or fails to comprehend, the Framers' perceptions regarding the
nature and dangers inherent in a democratic republic, the respective judi-
cial and legislative roles, and the relationship between majority rule and
majority tyranny. 5 8
Fear that governmental power could be abused was not equivalent
either to the withholding of plenary powers granted, or to distrust of the
people. While the Framers feared majority tyranny, they recognized that
the people would not have consented to be governed under any other but
a democratic regime.2 59 The Constitution details the boundaries of ten-
sion between fear of majority tyranny and desire for democratic rule.26 0
For the Framers, neither the Bill of Rights nor the judiciary could ulti-
mately provide protection against a people bent on exceeding the bounda-
ries to which they had agreed when ratifying the instrument. The charac-
ter of the people would be reflected in the types of representatives they
selected. While certain academicians might prefer a less democratic form
Elsewhere, I suggest that these non-majoritarian features were intended by the Founders
to delay and temper popular passion from immediate injection into legislative public poli-
cymaking and thereby pose a barrier to majority tyranny. See Gangi, supra note 2, at 59-60.
The Framers recognized and relied on the fact that it was the nature of emotion to be
temporary. Part of the price the majority chose to pay when it adopted the Constitution,
created in part to assure protection from majoritarian tyranny, was to create a barrier to the
enactment of "good" legislation based on good popular passion. Furthermore, if the popular
passion felt was "good," then, within 4 years, a supporting nationally based majority could
overcome any of the obstacles put in its path. Such a majority could then control each
government branch, and indeed, amend the Constitution itself.
How then did the Framers plan to diminish the possibility of majority tyranny while
retaining, consistent with the American spirit, the necessity of majority rule? The Founders
incorporated into the Constitution a "mixed regime" of institutional devices, comprised of
the division of power between the federal government and the states, and the separation of
powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, which would at least delay ill-consid-
ered measures and at most prevent them altogether. Two additional devices were the
Court's responsibility to see that the other branches remained within the boundaries of del-
egated authority and the difficult amendment process. Those who proposed and ratified the
Constitution accepted these limitations on the exercise of majority rule, thereby binding
themselves and future generations. These temporary institutional barriers, geared to assur-
ing deliberation, coupled with the people's collective loyalty to the instrument and their
sense of justice, were believed to be the best protections possible capable of preserving ma-
jority rule while minimizing the potential for majority tyranny. I contend that the above
description of majoritarianism is what was intended by the Founding Fathers and is most
consistent with historical facts. See generally W. KENDALL & G. CAREY, supra note 182, at
96-118; Kendall & Carey, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST v-xx (1966).
"I See supra text accompanying note 16. If the people believe that the original constitu-
tional limits are no longer necessary, they have the ability to discard these limits. As schol-
ars, we cannot rewrite history in order to avoid obtaining the consent of the governed; nor
may the judiciary. Gangi, supra note 2, at 62.
'o See Gangi, supra note 2, at 59-60; see also M. DIAMOND, W. FISK & H. GARFINKAL, THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 11-12 (1966) (insistence on majoritarian arrangement with protec-
tions of individual liberties).
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of government, such preference is clearly inconsistent with the intent of
the Founders.
Constitutionalized Values vs. Personal Preferences
While specialists tend to have particular tools or skills, they too, as
mere citizens, hold views on public issues. Not one of us would bow to the
opinion of a surgeon, for example, on matters of taxing and spending,
simply because he possesses medical expertise. The opinions of all citi-
zens stand on equal footing. Similarly, the fact that one purports to be a
constitutional scholar does not per se entitle his personal preferences to
greater weight than any other citizen. When he addresses public matters,
he must have an expertise distinct from the subject discussed, or his
views are entitled to no more weight than those of the surgeon. The views
of a constitutional scholar are not entitled to greater "authority" because
no expertise is thereby demonstrated. Furthermore, if he merely disguises
personal preferences by clothing them in constitutional terminology, the
scholar both coerces and deceives his fellow citizens. He pretends to ad-
dress a matter of public concern on the basis of expertise, when, in fact,
he really brings to the discussion nothing more than his own biases.
What must distinguish the constitutional scholar from others voicing
mere opinions is concern for and fidelity to the clearly discernible inten-
tions of the Framers. Should my fellow citizens come to unanimous agree-
ment on deviating from those intentions, I would stand fast against their
right to violate the clear intentions of the Framers, except by those proce-
dures specified in the Constitutional text.261 The fact that I may think
that the proposed deviation is better than the Framers' original inten-
tions should be irrelevant to my conclusion.
Members of the judiciary have been offered special responsibilities
and have accepted an opportunity to combine expertise with coercive
power.2 6 Accepting the responsibility of exercising coercive power neces-
sarily entails the added obligation to exercise it prudently. The responsi-
bility to exercise power prudently is the characteristic which distinguishes
members of the judiciary from other constitutional scholars. All constitu-
tional scholars, including judges, derive their expertise from the same
1 See Berger, supra note 225, at 188-92. Berger asserts:
[O]ne may have "philosophical preferences for limited government," or may prefer, as
anarchists do, no government at all, or a judicial oligarchy to an elective democratic
system based on majoritarian rule .... But we are not writing on a clean slate, free
to make such choices ab initio. They were made by the founders and ratified by the
people. It is not for academicians to repudiate those choices ....
Id. at 193.
2" Each member of the judiciary "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the]
Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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source, acquiring as best one can, knowledge relevant to the intentions of
the Framers.
The intentionist rejects an expanded judicial role. An expanded judi-
cial role requires members of the judiciary to become experts on topics
ranging from anatomy to zoology-to presume an expertise sufficient to
resolve differences of opinions within each field, as well as to evaluate
periodic challenges to essential assumptions therein. The intentionist rec-
ognizes that such expertise is inherently presumptuous and leads to the
probability that members of the judiciary will substitute personal prefer-
ences for those of the Framers or legislators. The judiciary's responsibility
is to guard constitutionalized principles and not to decide the common
good where those principles are not at issue. In summary, the intentionist
believes that it is quite enough for a judge to be required to have consti-
tutional competency and to exercise judicial power prudently. The Con-
stitution did not burden members of the judiciary with more. On the his-
torical record, the intentionist believes the Framers were correct, for
experience has taught that when members of the judiciary do not so con-
fine themselves, they have become neither competent nor prudent.
While disagreement among intentionists is inevitable, all recognize
that the task minimally requires a focus on the passive judicial virtues,
attention to the entire text of the Constitution and the purposes for
which it was framed, 1 3 adequate criteria of relevance,2 6 4 respect for prin-
cipled precedents,6 5 enunciation of canons of construction2 and appre-
ciation for prudence.267 There is an attempt to marshal evidence and to
employ logic illuminated by concrete action, not logic fed by speculation
or imagination. 6 8 To the extent that the principles constitutionalized by
the Framers can be discerned, intentionists attempt to protect and pre-
serve them.
While the intentionist is serious about preserving and protecting
principles constitutionalized by the Framers, he must be equally diligent
in recognizing those principles which have not been constitutionalized. By
demanding allegiance only to constitutionalized values there is a greater
prospect for assuring fidelity to them. Alternatively, when the intentionist
concludes that some principles were not constitutionalized by the Fram-
ers, he makes no judgment as to whether they should become public pol-
icy. Aside from protecting the principles constitutionalized, the intention-
1613 See infra text accompanying notes 279-80.
16 See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
6 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
167 See generally A. BIcKRL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 111-98 (1962).
2" See R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 74; Berger, Judicial Review: Counter Criticism in
Tranquility, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 390, 418-19 (1974).
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ist recognizes that self-government is precisely about disagreements over
what is in the interest of the common good. In the republic created by the
Constitution, the responsibility for such deliberation lies with those held
electorally accountable.
Politics: As Art or Folly
Changes that occur in public attitudes or politics, do not, by them-
selves, constitute conclusive proof that accompanying proposals are better
or worse for the common good than preceding policies. Reference to fu-
ture political, social, or economic trends, real or imagined, certainly offers
no legitimate perspective for the constitutional scholar.1s 9 Since constitu-
tional law concerns the intentions of the Framers, the primary object of a
scholar should be to discern those intentions: a text illuminated from the
perspective of those who framed it, with attention given to the people's
action.
The reader must not be deceived; a constitutional law issue cannot be
assumed to be correctly decided simply because five Justices on the Su-
preme Court so contend.17 0 Nevertheless, many scholars have focused
their attention on five votes. As a result, regarding the appointment pro-
cess for a Supreme Court Justice, it has become crucial to observe in
which areas the nominee is an activist and in which areas the nominee
believes restraint is more appropriate. Thus, if a particular nominee is
confirmed, we can predict which "scholars" will get their way and which
others will be relegated to crying in the wilderness. While some scholars
may choose to perceive these issues as exhausting the meaning of consti-
tutional law, the intentionist understands these realities as mere symp-
toms and not the disease. The disease is the absence of a principled per-
269 Purported knowledge of the "future" changes any inquiry from "what is just?" to the
question, "what is coming next?" Once the future is perceived as inevitable an inquiry into
"justice" is irrelevant. See generally G. NIEMEYER, supra note 30, at 74-75 (patterns of his-
torical progress). Evidence, not speculation, is the ultimate criteria, because "evidence be-
gets proof." See Gangi, supra note 2, at 7. Much of non-interpretative review today makes
insubstantial assertions about our history as it pursues believed beneficial results.
270 The personal views of the Justices were always a matter of concern. Even under the best
circumstances it takes a particular temperament, not to mention faith in the instrument, for
men to separate their personal opinions from their expertise. As fewer distinctions are made
between the two today, greater injection of personal views must be anticipated. Indeed, the
danger is that, as the original distinction between personal opinion and judicial duty fades,
there is less reason to treat Justices any differently than politicians: to limit the judicial
terms, or elect the Justices. This step, while a natural democratic response, would again
endanger the "mixed regime" character. See supra note 258. Professor Berger, for example,
clearly advocates and establishes the legitimacy of removing areas from Supreme Court ap-
pellate jurisdiction. That course may be pursued separate from impeachment. See generally
R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 153-172, 201-04 (Congressional contraction of judicial
jurisdiction).
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spective, the failure to inquire into and be confined by the clearly
discernible intentions of the Framers.
Similarly, the intentionist does not get his bearings from public opin-
ion polls, the apparent ultimate reference point for validating contempo-
rary judicial usurpations.2 7 Opinion polls merely register affirmative or
negative responses to questions usually defective in construction, and if
not defective, certainly not equivalent to deliberation. They record initial
attitudes, usually based on insufficient or inaccurate information. These
opinions lack reflection prompted by opposing arguments. For example, if
the following questions were asked: "Do you believe in capital punish-
ment?" and "On a scale of 1 to 10, how strongly do you hold your positive
or negative reply?," 2 " I suggest that it still might be possible, after delib-
eration, for intensely negative and affirmative respondents to reach a con-
sensus. There will probably be some respondents on either side unwilling
to budge, but in the deliberative process they either participate to pre-
serve as much of their position as they can when measured against those
who are more pragmatic, or they are ignored. To fervent opponents or
supporters of capital punishment, such "pragmatists" lack principle. The
intentionist, however, absent a constitutionalized principle, stands aside
in his capacity as a scholar. If approached regarding the constitutionality
of the proposed public policy regarding capital punishment, his criteria
are always the same: the clearly discernible intentions of the Framers."
No other criteria but the intentions of the Framers permit the
scholar to distinguish personal values from those contained in the Consti-
tution. Perhaps another example will demonstrate my position. If I de-
scribe the Supreme Court as "disclos[ing] a disconcerting reliance on se-
lective reasoning, manipulation and sometimes outright misstatement of
controlling precedent, '27 4 would I be referring to the laissez-faire Court,
the Warren Court, or the Burger Court? The intentionist recognizes that
this assessment, to varying degrees, is true of all three Courts. 75 The in-
See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 17-26 (discussing judicial review and
democracy); Perry, supra note 13, at 351-52 (discussing public opinion and abortion).
273 Assuming representative valid samples, are we to equate responses to these questions
with deliberation culminating in an end product called public law? Do such questions give
us an opportunity to think about a hired killer, a mass murderer, or a crime of passion? Do
they inform us in any detailed manner of the pertinent distinctions between, for instance,
one who previously has been convicted of murder and one who kills a fellow inmate or
prison guard while incarcerated? What are the present circumstances regarding the fre-
quency of rapes, or repeated rapes, after prior convictions for the same offense? What does
it tell us about assassination, terrorism, treason, or child murder?
'~ See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 178-80.
274 Note, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 89, 96 (1974).
Admittedly, the Burger Court differs from the Warren Court, but my emphasis here is
on the common tendency of these Courts to substitute personal opinions for those of legisla-
tors in death penalty, abortion, and trial by jury cases. Nor do I minimize the difficulty
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tentions of the Framers offer criteria for assessing such changes. If they
are consistently employed they transcend personal preferences. Absent
this criterion, however, scholars become mere recorders of the latest ma-
nipulation of precedents by those players currently in power.
In the absence of the above criteria it is no wonder that the Supreme
Court decisions have become a "mess. '27 6 Indeed, there is no significant
area of constitutional case law which is not embarassing to the serious
non-result-oriented scholar. 7 7 The Supreme Court has become an em-
barassment to the American political tradition for several reasons. First,
its opinions often are inconsistent and unconvincing. The Justices are try-
ing to put square pegs into round holes in order simultaneously to portray
continuity and make the document "living." Second, the Court increas-
ingly has gone beyond its legitimate power; its decisions rest on little
more than personal opinion or judicial compromise, effectively replacing
the national Madisonian scheme with the competing interests of nine in-
dividuals. Most of all, the opinions are embarassing because a majority of
the Court's members over the past 25 years has failed to recognize, or
worse, have recognized and suppressed, the realization that the Court has
elevated itself to the role of primary public policymaker.' 7s Surely the
Justices must suspect that such a role is contrary to that envisioned for it
by the Founding Fathers. 79
confronting a Justice committed to the intentions of the Framers, who finds himself among
a majority not so inclined. These matters must await exploration at some future time. It is
necessary, first, to establish governing principles.
27' Leedes, supra note 70, at 1365.
27 See, e.g., A. BIcKEL, supra note 22, at 175-76; Kurland, Foreword to The Supreme Court
1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 162-76 (1965); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1959). But see Wright, Professor Bickel, The
Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HAv. L. Rav. 769, 770 (1971). Judge
Wright sympathizes with Professor Bickel's distaste for the logically weak, result-oriented
decisions of the Warren Court, noting that Bickel went one step ahead of the majority of
scholarly criticism which constantly "reappears in most professional commentary on the
Court." Id. at 770-71. He argues that these essays have become "standard fare . . .but
hardly 'an event in the law.'" Id. at 771; see also Holland, supra note 52, at 1026 n.5.
"Judge Wright dismissed Bickel as one of a coterie of 'scholastic mandarins' . . . whose
'[i]deal Justices would become adept at sitting on their hands."' Id.
278 See Forrester, supra note 19, at 1214-15.
[T]he Supreme Court has evolved into a new institution... [which] can no longer be
described with any accuracy as a court .... It is a governing body in the sense that
it makes the basic policy decisions of the nation, selects among the competing values
of our society, and administers and executes the directions it chooses in political,
social, and ethical matters. It has become the major societal agency for reform.
Id.
'79 Berger finds this "untethered" discretion on the part of the judiciary in opposition to our
system of democracy, stating "[l]ittle did the Framers dream that the judicial power would
be construed as a license to supersede the exercise of power by the other branches within
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The Constitution embodied an experiential tension, balancing com-
peting values in the midst of existing concrete realities. The subsequent
addition of a Bill of Rights added little substance. Rather, it made ex-
plicit what had been presumed to be implicit: the applicability of com-
mon-law rights and the limited nature of powers granted to the federal
government. For national and international purposes, the people were
prepared to act as one. In other matters regarding public policy or human
affairs, however, the states were left free to pursue their own course. Self-
government entailed the competency to deal with any subject "thought
most meet and convenient for the general Good."28 0 Therefore, when judi-
cial interpretations reach conclusions rendering both federal and state
governments incompetent to deal with issues of public concern, and there
is a failure to locate the specific prohibition in the clearly discernible in-
tentions of the Framers, that judicial interpretation is inherently mis-
guided. Somewhere along the line, the judicial interpretation went astray
and either illegitimate presumptions were made, or the Justices injected
personal preferences into the constitutional text. The laissez-faire Court
made this mistake. 81 So have the Warren and Burger Courts.28 2 The es-
sential mistakes of all three Courts have been the same: illegitimate pre-
sumptions regarding history and progress, and the substitution of per-
sonal preferences for those of the Framers with respect to the nature of
rights. Where each specifically went astray is a matter of detail.
Deliberation vs. Judicial Review
To the extent that the adoption of the Constitution required the se-
lection of certain principles over others, we are bound to those principles
and any deviation from, at least, those that are clearly discernible must
be addressed to the people who consented, thereby giving the instrument
life."'s In all other matters the Constitution is clear: "All legislative Pow-
those boundaries." R. BERGER, supra note 74, at 250-51.
Mayflower Compact (1620).
u' See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
'ss See supra note 275.
' See U.S. CONST. art. V (amendment procedure). We must approach constitutional provi-
sions in a differentiated manner. Permit me to illustrate this point, as well as those made in
the text, by offering several examples:
1. Broad Sections: The Bill of Rights essentially must be construed as a limit on federal
power, specifying procedures traditionally associated with minimizing executive and judicial
abuses in criminal prosecutions. There is no basis for applying the first amendment to the
states totally, by absorption or selectivity. There also is no constitutional basis for a pre-
ferred freedoms doctrine. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 10-28.
2. Several specifics: (a) Two year term in the House of Representatives-The Framers
argued about the length of a congressman's term. The 2 year term selected, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 1, must be viewed in light of the democratic character of the regime: consent
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ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
expressed in electoral accountability. The Framers did resolve the issue, constitutionalizing
the accountability of those believed closest to the people by assuring greater frequency of
selection than exists for a Senator or the President. While the length of Presidential terms
offered greater possibility for unity of action, the frequency of representative election in-
jected considerations of consent, and Senatorial terms prevented the injection of emotion,
into legislation. The Supreme Court, of course, was the last line of defense against aban-
doning constitutionalized values. Not even the most open-ended exponents, see supra notes
85-110 and accompanying text, suggest that today we are no longer bound by a two year
term for representatives. My point is not only that we are bound by this "clear" intention,
but that the intention contained a value which was selected over others and which, in fact,
is part of a tension, a balancing of considerations.
(b) Presidential Re-eligibility-The Framers argued rather vigorously over whether the
President should be eligible for unlimited terms. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 71 & 72, at 481-
92 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke, ed.). Considerations of competent, effective leadership were
weighed against the potential for abuse of power. The Framers won ratification because of
the former qualities, which is an interesting fact in light of the modern belief that they
considered man as having a "bad" nature. In any event, we were bound by the Framers'
judgment on Presidential eligibility until our experience suggested exercising greater caution
in the matter. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. We still acknowledge today, however, that re-
eligibility has a good deal to say for itself. We wonder if perhaps the amendment was pre-
cipitous, prompted too much by particular political and historical experiences. Can a court
today hold that such circumstances have passed and therefore, the 22nd amendment is null
and void? Of course not. In fact, is that not the position today regarding most amendments,
particularly the ninth and tenth?
We, as people, are bound by limited Presidential terms. In the same manner we have
reached greater, if not complete, clarity regarding Presidential succession and disability. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. While I am sure disagreement regarding interpretations will oc-
cur, there must be common agreement regarding important aspects of the specified Presi-
dential succession and disability structures to which we are bound.
3. An "ambiguous" clause-Commerce-The Framers certainly meant something when
they stated in the Commerce Clause: "with Foreign Nations, and among the several States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. There was no history of the term's usage as there had been for
the term "due process." See Berger, supra note 225, at 183-84. From the language and ac-
companying actions this much may be concluded regarding the Commerce Clause: the
Framers did not intend to give Congress control over all commerce, but only that "with
Foreign Nations" and "among" the states. We are fairly certain, however, that control over
commerce was not perceived in frugal terms, particularly in light of the failure of the Arti-
cles of Confederation and the "desire to form a more perfect union," U.S. CONST. preamble.
After all, we are talking about phrases in the text: phrases, moreover, that must have
had some meaning and implied some limits. Commerce, whatever it means precisely, is a
constitutionalized judgment, not one pulled out of thin air, lacking any usage. See Crying
Wolf, supra note 76, at 948-49.
I agree that the Court must have some input. Let us assume, however, good-faith adju-
dication of, and perhaps even some historical support for, a decision by the Court negating
proposals of the people's representatives on the ground that, in the opinion of a majority,
the judgment constitutionalized by the Framers was transgressed. See, e.g., Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935). Assuming there is a consensus that the
Court is correct in that judgment, the option remains that we could change the instrument
by passing a constitutional amendment. See Berger, supra note 1, at 564-65.
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States .. ."s The essence of self-government is deliberation on matters
concerning the common good. It is necessary, therefore, to affirm that
consent must be obtained to change meanings previously constitutional-
ized,285 and to concede that, insofar as those principles have not been con-
stitutionalized, the people are free to deliberate and act. If that were not
the case, then a Constitution would not be meaningful or necessary.
The American tradition clearly identifies the representative assembly
as having primary responsibility for deliberation on public policy mat-
ters .2 8 6 For example, each constituent congressional or senatorial district
contributes an initial viewpoint on matters of public concern when it
elects its representatives. 8 7 In some instances, on some issues, citizens
clearly express those opinions and hold them with fierce intensity, while
in other instances the issues do not evoke intense feelings, and it is nearly
impossible to determine upon what basis one candidate received more
votes than his opponent. In a legislative assembly, opinions are sifted,
and assessments of how much can be obtained or how much loss can be
prevented, on each issue, are ascertained.
2 8 8
In brief, the Constitution contains values selected by the Framers. These values are not
discernible with a sufficient degree of clarity. In that manner, as those intentions become
less clear, there may be some room for judicial policymaking. See Sandolow, supra note 89,
at 1189. Similarly, there may be more reason for judicial prudence requiring greater defer-
ence to those electorally accountable. In this manner, however, the paradigm is still before
us-we know that the regime is a democratic republic, not a judicial obligarchy.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
288 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 45-47.
As traditionally understood, while the Legislature represents the highest political au-
thority, each legislator must subordinate himself to a higher law. See supra note 31.
287 The remarks that follow in the text are limited to the federal legislative body. There is
no principled difference with respect to state legislatures, except those identified by
Madison, for example, in THE FEDERALIST, supra note 283, No. 10, at 61-64 (J. Madison).
Each state has its own constitutional tension containing procedural and substantive values.
If pretensions of federal minimum-rights standards are ignored, the intentionist position in
itself poses no obstacle to those suggesting the desirability of more stringent protection of
individual rights. If, however, judicial power on the state level similarly makes illegitimate
presumptions, or annoints itself with a judicial role contrary to state charter, citizens are
perfectly within their rights in taking whatever measures they feel are appropriate.
Professor Parker, for example, not only indicates dissatisfaction with current perspec-
tives of "process-focused" adjudication, but hints that "substantive issues," relating to re-
distribution of wealth, are necessary for our system to work well. He addresses questions of
social justice. Parker, supra note 92, at 236-39. He should, however, prove a historical case
or abandon pretentions to our tradition. Likewise, he must convince the people of the case
he makes and not seek to impose it through the judiciary by open-ended adjudication.
'" Principles of justice can, and often do, conflict with mere self-interest; passion competes
with logic, and all represent concrete existences. Present also, of course, are institutional
and Madisonian elements. See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches:
Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 810 (1974). But see Parker, supra
note 92, at 258. There are also frequent appeals to more universal standards-a higher
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The intentionist acknowledges that elected representatives, charged
with the responsibility of deliberating, may shirk that duty. The inten-
tionist describes such shirking as perhaps symptomatic of the prevalent
disease-judicial usurpation of the legislative power. First, he notes that
while the fact of the deliberative power was specified, the Framers clearly
perceived the role of deliberator as one of responsibility: power intimately
associated with moral duty and subordinate to a higher law.2"' Second,
deference to executive qualities of unity, secrecy, and dispatch is legiti-
mate, while abandonment of the responsibility to deliberate in favor of
Presidential "mandates" or opinion polls is not.2"' Third, and perhaps
most important, is the intentionist's resistance to the legislators' conven-
ient acceptance of executive or judicial usurpation because it relieves
them from the need to deliberate and reach concrete decisions which may
expose them to increased prospects of electoral defeat.2 91 The intentionist
must, therefore, address his criteria of relevance to all public participants.
He regrets the failure to attend to that duty on the part of any partici-
pant, but for that very reason, he cannot abandon his own.292
law-real and imagined. There are attempted injections of principle and pretensions of the
same when they happen to coincide with advocated self-interest. In short, there are compet-
ing values and needs, and all impact on concrete citizen existence. Hopefully, there are also
principled considerations of justice, not simply on deductive reasoning from perhaps suspect
premises, but by observation of actual concrete realities. In the eyes of some, it always will
appear that self-interest triumphs too frequently over justice.
18" See supra notes 31 & 286. Professor Yarbrough indicates "the Framers' novel instance
[was that] each branch of the government, and not just the lower house of the legislature,
represents the people." Yarbrough, Thoughts on the Federalists' View of Representation,
12 NORTHEASTERN POL. Sci. A. 65, 66 (1979). In their scheme "the members of the learned
professions, and more particularly, the lawyers," id. at 77, had a special place-for a special
reason.
What Tocqueville, like Hamilton, seems to have in mind are lawyers schooled in
the great common law tradition. A respect for procedure and tradition, as well as an
appreciation of the importance of institutions in preserving liberty distinguishes them
from both their country cousins, so acidly described by Edmund Burke in his Reflec-
tions on the Revolution in France, as well as the successful merchants and farmers
whose interest is private and whose motive is profit.
Id. at 78 n.29.
190 It is necessary to make explicit what already has been implied: the American political
tradition does not consist primarily of Presidential mandates. Presidential elections serve to
introduce one participant in the debate over public policy options. He is an important par-
ticipant in the debate and unquestionably performs an important constitutional role, but his
position, I suggest, is intentionally second in the text for symbolic reasons. Congress, within
its constitutional limits, is first. Upon Congress falls the central constitutional responsibil-
ity-deliberation for the public good.
"91 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 23-33.
192 There is nothing preventing the intentionist from announcing his judgments regarding
dereliction of responsibility in the clearest of terms. After all, like all citizens, he is entitled
to voice his opinion. However, he must resist once again the temptation to confuse his per-
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The intentionist, as a citizen, should vigorously add his opinion to
the fray. He must take care, however, when doing so, to distinguish per-
sonal judgments from the key to constitutional expertise-identification
and clarification of the Framer's intentions. It is precisely this expertise
which may encourage an intentionist to advocate the abandonment of
some of the selfsame intentions he helped to identify, but, of course, only
by the appropriate procedures. Similarly, he will be the first among his
colleagues to insist that the people are free to deliberate on matters
others claim are closed because they allegedly constitute violation of
"rights" guaranteed by the instrument. Violation of rights is a serious
charge, but to make it, the accuser is obliged to demonstrate historically
that the actions contemplated. by the legislature are contrary to the
meanings of rights as understood by those who framed them. Only to that
meaning are we bound. If the accuser cannot do so, then no "right" is
established, and the accuser confuses his personal judgment of what con-
stitutes good public policy with that which fidelity to the instrument
demands.
Perspective on Stakes
It is suggested that subscription to the intentionist position herein
described would entail repudiation of almost every significant modern Su-
preme Court decision regarding, among other topics, due process, equal
protection, and the Bill of Rights.93 Non-interpretivists make their point:
they believe that many Court decisions in the past three decades were
wise, good, just, and conducive to the public well-being.' They support a
view of judicial power without which such beneficial results may not have
been achieved, or at least not achieved as quickly.2" However, after con-
sonal opinion regarding responsibility of public officials on principles not constitutionalized,
with those expert judgments on matters which he believes were constitutionalized. There is
no institutional cure for dereliction of legislative responsibility except those processes that
hold legislators electorally accountable for their actions. When, however, those who are po-
litically accountable exceed their authority as discernible from the intentions of the Fram-
ers, an institutional cure is envisioned: the Supreme Court power of judicial review. See id.
at 11-13, 24-26.
293 If Berger's historical perspective is adopted, these decisions could be undermined. See,
e.g., Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603,
611-18 (1978); Kutler, supra note 10, at 512-19.
29 See Gangi, supra note 2, at 33-37. Noninterpretivists, it must be assumed, seek the pub-
lic good. Their sincerity is not at all questioned, only the authority to impose their version
of the good through "non-interpretative" judicial action is debated.
... See Bridwell, supra note 95, at 473 n.14. Bridwell severely criticizes arguments favoring
expansive judicial activism "structured around the horrible results that will allegedly occur
without it. . . . What passes for a defense of a particular form of judicial power rests almost
entirely upon the assumed advantage that would accrue to its existence." Id.
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sidering the beneficent results claimed, I contend that there are other is-
sues of at least equal importance. Primary among those issues is whether
our people have the right to self-government originally procured by the
Constitution, and whether that right may be taken away or modified
without their consent. These rights are at the center of our tradition, and
the Constitution, together with all subsequent amendments, is its sym-
bolic expression.
The stakes are indeed high, the penalties so severe that the inten-
tionist must put them forthrightly on the table. First, if the judiciary is
no longer required to be faithful to the Constitution, then the Constitu-
tion can no longer accurately be described as embodying our tradition.
Government by judiciary constitutes a radical change in that tradition.
Second, accordingly, no longer can democratic self-government be consid-
ered essential to either our tradition or the Constitution. These concepts
evaporate once government by judiciary is defended as legitimate. 96
Third, if judicial usurpation is sanctioned, no principled objection may be
raised against similar action by another branch. Eventually, usurpations
by the most powerful and numerous branch must be expected to prevail.
Fourth, when that occurs, thereby eliminating any check on majority
power, the most numerous branch may of course simply obliterate the
results initially thought beneficent and imposed by judicial usurpation.
Fifth, should the majority go further, attacking principles clearly in-
tended by the Framers to be protected, no refuge may be sought in the
instrument; fidelity to original intentions has been destroyed by the pre-
sumed beneficence of the first result imposed through judicial usurpation.
This projected scenario is not merely in the imagination of the inten-
tionist. It is written in the history of prior republics and is an awareness,
the intentionist believes, the Framers were far more attentive to than
their non-interpretive successors. For this reason, the intentionist insists
that it is necessary to separate constitutionalized values from those which
were not constitutionalized to distinguish professional from personal
opinions. In light of such distinctions the people are free to adopt by
amendment or deliberation the results currently advocated by non-inter-
pretive adherents. This would preserve for posterity the structures which
make pursuit of such results perenially possible in the context of consent.
The intentionist, by focusing on intentions, cannot help but develop
a historical perspective. The record of the past century is not a pleasant
one to behold: one presumptuous wave of "progress" succeeded another.
In each era, new "natural laws" spawned new systems and suppressed
more questions related to the common good. In each era there has been
Usurpations are not legitimized by either repetition or acquiescence, particularly when
the latter is obtained by the subterfuge that the latest usurpations are allegedly required by
the constitution. See Berger, supra note 1, at 544-45.
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an unfailing belief in the "science" of law.""
The intentionist maintains that law is an art, not a science. Our Con-
stitution does not exhaust the art, but elevates some principles above
others and demands fidelity to them by members of the body politic.
Among those principles constitutionalized was judicial review.29 The ju-
dicial power is not the legislative power, and can never, therefore, legiti-
mately offer final answers on matters left open to deliberation. For the
following reasons, the intentionist insists that the judicial power, as all
other powers and principles constitutionalized, must be interpreted with
reference to the clearly discernible intentions of the Framers.2 "
First, by its very nature, a Constitution consists of some principles,
selected over others, to which all statutory law must be subordinated, and
to which all public officials owe allegiance.900 The constitutionalized
power of judicial review was narrow in scope when determining whether
the other branches of government overstepped their limits.301 Second, by
confining its judgments to an understanding of the clearly discernible in-
tentions of the Framers, the likelihood of the judiciary constitutionalizing
personal preferences or the zeitgeist of the times is significantly re-
duced. 30 2 Third, the responsibility for adapting the Constitution to chang-
ing needs was left in the hands of the people.303 The right of self-govern-
ment was constitutionalized by the Framers, but there is no self-
government without consent.'"
Fourth, since the intentionist confines the judicial role to the policing
of constitutional boundaries, representative institutions are to be ac-
corded, within the boundaries discernible from the Framers' intentions,
the widest possible scope to deliberate on matters of public policy consid-
ered "meet and convenient for the general Good. 3 0 5 There probably will
exist competing views on what is necessary for the common good among a
multiplicity of factions; it is impossible for the judiciary to assess how
intensely, and by how many, such views are held.30 6 Assessment is possi-
ble only through the electoral process followed by deliberation. 80 7 From
, See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
2" See Gangi, supra note 2, at 56-57.
300 See supra note 283.
301 See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
SO See generally W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 5-10 (1961)
(perceptions of judicial role); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTrITUDES AND IDEOLO-
GIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963 97-157 (1965) (discussion of Liberalism).
000 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
o See Gangi, supra note 2, at 54.
30 Mayflower Compact (1620).
8o See Choper, supra note 288, at 833-39; Rehnquist, supra note 89, at 699-703.
001 Berger asserts that "the track record of the Court does not inspire confidence that it is a
NON-INTERPRETIVE REvIEw
deliberation emerges not necessarily truth or goodness but public policy
choices for which the representatives are held electorally accountable.
Fifth, principles set forth by the Framers are not infallible; nor
should they remain unchanged forever. The intentionist does contend,
however, that the principles constitutionalized are binding on all three
branches of government unless and until the people consent to revisions
through the amending process.30 8 This position creates a substantial bar-
rier, intended by the Framers as such, to the inevitable tendency of a
people to infuse the newest wave of fashionable truth into the fabric of
the Constitution. The need to confront and compare newly perceived
principles with already constitutionalized ones prompts deliberation on
the highest level: the difficult amendment process.
For the intentionist, judicial adoption and infusion of the newest
truth into the Constitution, due to judicial failure to keep the intentions
of the Framers properly before them, merely leads to the need for ridding
the instrument of those incrustations, either found not to have been con-
stitutionally required, or found unnecessary in the long term public inter-
est, to deal with changing circumstances. The intentionist believes that
repeated errors of this sort will inevitably lower the stature of those prin-
ciples that were constitutionalized by the Framers.
Finally, the intentionist puts forth what may be called the fidelity
argument: "This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.... ."9 Each member of the judiciary "shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution. . . .1 The Framers did not
believe that those taking this oath promised allegiance to vagueness, gen-
erality, or open-endedness.s" On the contrary, the Framers created a
Constitution containing specific principles: their intentions help us under-
stand those principles. Members of the judiciary have a special duty to
remind those in all branches of the government, including themselves, of
the clearly discernible intentions of the Framers.
The judicial "oath or affirmation" of constitutional fidelity is some-
what unique because, while all officials of the government take the same
oath of constitutional fidelity, there is this difference: members of the leg-
islature remain free to consider a "higher law" when deliberating on mat-
ters not preempted by having been constitutionalized s.3 1 However, since
better judge of what the people should do than the people themselves .... '[T]ime has
proved that [the Court's] judgment was wrong on most of the outstanding issues upon which
it has chosen to challenge the popular branches."' R. BERGER, supra note 133, at 179 (quot-
ing Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson) (citations omitted).
I" See U.S. CONST. art. V.
300 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
310 Id. cl. 3.
"' See supra notes 49, 89, 97 & 100 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 234 & 286 and accompanying text.
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the judicial function is neither to deliberate upon, nor decide questions of
public policy where principles have not been constitutionalized, the judi-
ciary cannot legitimately appeal to any "higher law" than the Constitu-
tion to which they have sworn allegiance. Unlike the theorist who is free
to perceive truth, members of the judiciary wear robes of constitutional
fidelity. While a man may choose to wear either judicial or theoretical
robes, he may not choose both when, pursuant to his oath, he acts in an
official judicial capacity. Until the emergence of modern constitutional
law, the significance of the judicial oath had been clear, and, for the most
part, respected. The Supreme Court must revitalize that traditional un-
derstanding of its judicial duty and act accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The role played by the present judiciary is not significantly different
from that played by its laissez-faire predecessor. Both infuse personal
opinions into the constitutional text. Neither was elected; therefore,
neither could have been, or is, politically accountable. Whatever the tem-
porary beneficence of such behavior, it is inconsistent with the scheme of
government born two centuries ago. The time of lying and self-deception
has long passed: "the sovereign people. . . at long last are entitled to be
told that the Court has taken over national policy making, and to be
asked to ratify the takeover. That will be the moment of truth. '318
813 Berger, supra note 1, at 575 (footnote omitted).
